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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Explosion in the Gulf of Mexico!  Five million barrels of crude oil 
escape into the ocean!1  During the spring and summer of 2010, the world 
 
 1.  Jeremy Repanich, The Deepwater Horizon Spill by the Numbers, POPULAR MECHANICS 
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watched as the Deepwater Horizon sank into the sea.2  And as the doomed 
oilrig settled upon the seafloor, attorneys filed mounting lawsuits against the 
companies involved.3  Concurrently, speculation arose as to how much 
money, if any, the companies would have to pay in punitive damages—a 
question that remains unanswered to this day.4  Certainly, with hundreds of 
thousands affected in the Gulf States and beyond, if punitive damages are 
 
(Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/coal-oil-gas/bp-oil-spill-
statistics.  At the time of the Deepwater Horizon explosion, the ink had barely dried on the Supreme 
Court decision of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 514 (2008), where the Court 
determined punitive damages were permissible under maritime law if they were equal to 
compensatory damages.  See also David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in U.S. Maritime Law: 
Miles, Baker, and Townsend, 70 LA. L. REV. 463, 466–69 (2010) (recounting the history of punitive 
damages in maritime law, including their original purpose as a tool for punishment and deterrence).  
In Exxon, the plaintiffs were originally given a $5 billion punitive damage award after the Exxon 
Valdez ran aground—thanks to the captain of the ship being intoxicated—and millions of gallons of 
crude oil spilled into Prince William Sound.  554 U.S. at 471.  The punitive damage award was later 
reduced to a little over $500 million.  Id. at 515.  Almost immediately after the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster, people began to draw comparisons to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, contemplating whether BP 
would be subjected to the same treatment by the courts as Exxon.  Anne C. Mulkern, BP’s Oil Spill 
Bill Could Dwarf Exxon’s Valdez Tab, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/05/03/03greenwire-bps-oil-spill-bill-could-dwarf-exxons-
ivaldezi-91298.html?pagewanted=all. 
 2.  Associated Press, Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig Sinks, Sparking Pollution Fears, THE 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/23/deepwater-horizon-oil- 
rig-pollution. 
 3.  Curt Anderson & Thomas Watkins, Lawyers Flock to Gulf Coast for Oil Spill Lawsuits, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 1, 2010, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2010/may/01/lawyers-flock-to-
gulf-coast-for-oil-spill-lawsuits/.  Within the first two weeks of the incident, twenty-six lawsuits 
were filed in federal court “by commercial fishermen, charter boat captains, resort management 
companies and individual property owners in Louisiana, Florida, Alabama and Mississippi.”  Id.  
The companies being sued—particularly by the United States Department of Justice—include: 
Anadarko Exploration & Production LP and Anadarko Petroleum Corp.; British Petroleum; MOEX 
Offshore 2007 LLC.; Triton Asset Leasing GMBH; Transocean Holdings LLC, Transocean Offshore 
Deepwater Drilling, Inc., and Transocean Deepwater, Inc.; and Transocean’s insurer, QBE 
Underwriting Ltd./Lloyd’s Syndicate 1036.  Justice Department Sues BP, Others Over Gulf Spill, 
NPR (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/12/15/132083722/u-s-sues-bp-others-over-gulf-oil-
spill. 
 4.  Some economists have hypothesized that the spill could cost BP as “little” as $3 billion 
while other professionals—particularly attorneys—foresee BP paying $10–$15 billion or possibly 
more.  Betsy Schiffman, How Much Will BP Have to Pay for the Oil Spill?, DAILYFINANCE (Apr. 
30, 2010), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/04/30/how-much-will-bp-have-to-pay-for-the-oil-
spill/.  By August 2011, BP had paid more than $5 billion to 204,434 victims and had agreed to 
spend $1.7 billion on cleanup efforts as well as alternative expenses.  Moira Herbst, BP Fund Has 
Paid Out $5 Billion to Gulf Spill Victims, RECENT BUS. NEWS (Aug. 24, 2011), 
http://ourbusinessnews.com/bp-fund-has-paid-out-5-billion-to-gulf-spill-victims.  This money has 
come from a $20 billion escrow account set up by BP and managed by Kenneth Feinberg.  Id.  As of 
January 2012, BP had paid $7 billion in personal claims and remains responsible for clean-up costs 
and economic losses expected to total about $40 billion.  Margaret Cronin Fisk & Allen Johnson Jr., 
BP Must Cover Some Halliburton Gulf Spill Costs, Judge Says, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 31, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-31/bp-must-indemnify-halliburton-for-gulf-oil-spill-
judge-says.html. 
07 SANDERS SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/13  3:23 PM 
[Vol. 40: 785, 2013] Uncle Sam and the Partitioning Punitive Problem 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
787 
awarded, they will be monumental.5  However, a seemingly curious but 
equally important question also arises: if punitive damages are ordered, to 
whom should they be awarded to best ensure that they benefit the Gulf Coast 
and those affected by the tragedy? 
Firmly rooted in American jurisprudence, punitive damages are intended 
to be a societal good—serving the vital roles of punishment and deterrence, 
and thereby filling the niche between civil and criminal law.6  Yet, there are 
two major problems with punitive damages: first, even though punitive 
damages are meant to benefit society as a whole, without specified funds 
plaintiffs often receive windfalls; and second, if left unchecked, punitive 
damages have a detrimental affect upon the courts, and, more importantly, 
upon the economy.7  With regard to the oil spill, nearly everyone agrees that 
BP and some of the other companies involved should be punished for any 
tortious improprieties that led to the Deepwater Horizon disaster.8  But there 
is nothing to ensure that the named plaintiffs would spend a punitive damage 
award—above any money they have already received—in a manner 
beneficial to the area affected by the spill, nor is there a proper 
understanding about the effect a large punitive damage award would have on 
oil economy states like Louisiana.9  Some degree of regulation is necessary 
to address these issues.10 
 
 5.  Currently there is a push to increase the cap on punitive damages awarded in maritime cases 
to $10 billion to make sure that BP can be properly punished and plaintiffs can receive as much 
money as possible.  BP Oil Spill Damages & Compensation, RUMRELL L. NETWORK, 
http://bpoilspilldamages.us/damages-compensation /overview/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2012). 
 6.  See infra Part II.B. 
 7.  See infra Part II.B. 
 8.  Punishing BP: 6 Brutal Proposals, THE WEEK (May 28, 2010), 
http://theweek.com/article/index/ 203410/punishing-bp-6-brutal-proposals. 
 9.  John Burnett, Despite Spill, Louisiana Remains Wedded To Oil, NPR (June 24, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128064058.  By August 2011, 947,892 claims 
had been filed by plaintiffs from all fifty states and from thirty-six countries.  Herbst, supra note 4.  
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana—located in New Orleans—is 
overseeing all litigation against the companies involved in the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.  See 
Update: Agreement Reached with BP, PLAINTIFFS’ STEERING COMMITTEE, 
http://www.bpmdl2179.com/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2012); see also Current Developments, MDL-
2179 OIL SPILL BY OIL RIG “DEEPWATER HORIZON”, 
http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/OilSpill.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2012) (including the docket 
for the Deepwater Horizon federal claims). 
  In a major ruling, District Court Judge Carl Barbier limited all lawsuits to federal claims, 
concluding that “[t]he case properly falls into maritime law and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act, both federal laws.”  Rebecca Mowbray, Judge Allows Some Punitive Damages in BP Oil Spill 
Lawsuits, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 29, 2011, http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-
spill/index.ssf/2011/08/judge_dismisses_bp_oil_spill_c.html.  While the latter is silent as to punitive 
damages, maritime law provides that punitive damages may be awarded.  Id.; see also Lauren E. 
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One such proposed regulation on punitive damages has been the split-
recovery statute.11  Recently, a bill for the National Endowment for the 
Oceans included a split-recovery statute, allocating to the Endowment 25% 
of any punitive damages awarded in a federal civil action arising from torts 
occurring on the Outer Continental Shelf in excess of $100,000.12  Even so, 
split-recovery statutes have not come without their own problems and 
challenges—particularly, allegations that they violate the Constitution’s 
Takings and Excessive Fines Clauses.13  Although a number of state courts 
have heard cases involving these arguments, the judicial outcomes have been 
conflicting and non-dispositive.14  As such, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in 
Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture was important because it 
specifically analyzed the two-horn constitutional dilemma and concluded 
that split-recovery statutes do not violate the Constitution.15 
However, the court failed to resolve the problem that arises when a 
plaintiff is awarded punitive damages in federal court on federal law claims 
in a state that has a split-recovery statute.16  More importantly, the court 
failed to solve the issue of nullification of split-recovery statutes through 
post-verdict settlements.17  This is particularly important to the BP oil spill, 
where all claims have been limited to those arising under federal law and 
there is no current federal punitive restrictor.18  In light of the foregoing, the 
question arises: is a split-recovery statute the best way to control punitive 
damages and make sure they function as a societal benefit?  Given the 
residual problems associated with split-recovery statutes, it is more prudent 
 
Hume, Are We Sailing in Occupied Waters?: Rethinking the Availability of Punitive Damages Under 
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1446 (2011) (discussing whether punitive 
damages should be awarded under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 for the Deepwater Horizon 
incident).  Additionally, this means that the case will be decided “by a judge without a jury,” Romero 
v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 363 (1959), with the judge hopefully 
keeping the aforementioned considerations in mind when deciding a damage award. 
 10.  See infra Part III.B. 
 11.  See infra Part III. 
 12.  S. 973, 112th Cong. § 5 (2011).  After being read twice by the Senate Committee in 2011, 
the bill was referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation where it remains 
to date.  Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status 112th Congress (2011–2012) S.973, THOMAS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:s.00973: (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
  The United States Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) encompasses the underwater area lying 
between a coastal state’s jurisdiction and federal jurisdiction.  The Outer Continental Shelf, OCS 
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY AND ALTERNATE USE PROGRAMMATIC EIS, 
http://ocsenergy.anl.gov/guide/ocs/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).  Generally, the OCS begins 
three to nine miles offshore and extends 200 nautical miles outward.  Id. 
 13.  See infra Part III.B. 
 14.  See infra Part III.B. 
 15.  Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 16.  See infra Part V. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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for the federal government to adopt a federal monitory tax on punitive 
damage awards, thereby magnifying the benefits of a split-recovery system 
through an already-functioning tool without the perennial problems 
associated with split-recovery statutes.19 
Part II of this Comment progresses through the history of punitive 
damages, including the purpose behind punitive damages and attempts to 
reform or limit punitive damages.  Part III reviews the history and purpose 
of split-recovery statutes.  Additionally, this Part discusses the dual 
constitutional challenges brought against split-recovery statutes and the 
courts that have found split-recovery statutes to be invalid.  Part IV analyzes 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Engquist v. Oregon Department of 
Agriculture, specifically examining the court’s conclusion that the split-
recovery statute did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause or 
the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.  Part V examines the 
current federal restrictions on punitive damages, shows why it is important 
for the federal government to take swift action to prevent plaintiff windfalls, 
and advocates for a federal monitory tax to regulate punitive damage 
awards. 
II.  PUNITIVE DAMAGES GENERALLY 
A.  History and Purpose of Punitive Damages 
Though precursors of punitive damages may be traced back to thirteenth 
century England,20 the genesis of modern day United States punitive damage 
law came about in the late eighteenth century.21  Beginning with the 1784 
 
 19.  See infra Part V. 
 20.  See Semra Mesulam, Collective Rewards and Limited Punishment: Solving the Punitive 
Damages Dilemma with Class, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1114, 1121 (2004) (reviewing the early history 
of punitive damages). 
 21.  Leah R. Mervine, Bridging the “Philosophical Void” in Punitive Damages: Empowering 
Plaintiffs and Society Through Curative Damages, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1587, 1599–1603 (2007); see 
also Lee Katherine Goldstein, Split-Recovery Statutes Do More Harm Than Good, 38 COLO. LAW. 
105 (2009) (discussing the use establishment of punitive damages in English common law by 1763, 
as well as their use in America prior to the adoption of the Constitution); Bethany Rabe, The 
Constitutionality of Split-Recovery Punitive Damage Statutes: Good Policy but Bad Law, 2008 
UTAH L. REV. 333, 333–35 (suggesting that while what we think of as punitive damages arose in 
England during the latter part of the 1700s, punitive damages may be traced back to the days of 
Hammurabi’s Code).  Other legal scholars have also pointed to the Mosaic Law for evidence of 
punitive damages.  James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic that has 
Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1984) (citing multiple Scriptures from the 
biblical book of Exodus wherein a person was required to restore more to the injured party than  the 
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case of Genay v. Norris, the practice of awarding punitive damages for 
particularly repugnant conduct or for a very serious injury was introduced as 
an arrow in the court’s quiver.22  It has subsequently become a powerful 
weapon.23 
Initially, punitive damages were only available for traditional intentional 
torts—“assault and battery, libel and slander, malicious prosecution, false 
imprisonment, and intentional interferences with property.”24  Additionally, 
they were not widely used, nor were they readily distinguishable from 
traditional damages awards.25  Over time, however, courts began to apply the 
legal theory more frequently, forging a common law delineation between 
compensatory damages—meant to place the injured party in the position he 
or she was in prior to the injury—26and “punitive damages [which] are 
awarded against the defendant to punish and deter [him or her], not as 
additional compensation for the plaintiff.”27  By 1818, the Supreme Court of 
the United States had begun to recognize that in cases of gross or wanton 
misconduct, a defendant “may be made responsible beyond the loss actually 
sustained.”28  Thirty-three years later, the Supreme Court, in Day v. 
 
actual harm caused). 
 22.  Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6, 6 (1784); see Mervine, supra note 21, at 1600; see also 
Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77, 77–78 (N.J. 1791) (encouraging the jury to award damages beyond 
actual suffering and losses, in an attempt to deter such offenses in the future).  While the term 
“punitive damages” is used to identify an amount of damages awarded in excess of compensatory 
damages, it also often connotes “exemplary or vindictive damages, ‘smart money,’ and the like.”  
Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Punitive Damages: Power of Equity Court to Award, 58 A.L.R. 4th 844, 
844 n.2 (1987). 
 23.  See infra notes 30–42. 
 24.  Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages “Run Wild”: Proposals for Reform 
By Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1999) [hereinafter Schwartz, Reining in 
Punitive Damages]. 
 25.  Mervine, supra note 21, at 1601–02; see Mesulam, supra note 20, at 1122 (describing how 
punitive damages were slow to become widespread); Victor E. Schwartz et al., I’ll Take That: Legal 
and Public Policy Problems Raised by Statutes That Require Punitive Damages Awards to be 
Shared with the State, 68 MO. L. REV. 525, 527–28 (2003) [hereinafter Schwartz, I’ll Take That]  
(explaining the slow growth of punitive damages between the early days in America and the 1960s). 
 26.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1979).  See generally Jill Wieber Lens, 
Honest Confusion: The Purpose of Compensatory Damages in Tort and Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 231, 235–36 (2011) (reviewing a four-step purpose analysis 
for compensatory damages). 
 27.  Mervine, supra note 21, at 1597 (emphasis omitted).  Multiple courts, like the Supreme 
Court of Indiana, have stated, “To the extent punitive damages are recoverable, they are a creature of 
the common law.”  Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467, 471 (Ind. 2003).  As such, the power of 
punitive damages can quickly be overcome by legislation.  See infra notes 78–89 and accompanying 
text. 
 28.  The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546, 553 (1818); Mesulam, supra note 20, at 1122 (discussing 
the early Supreme Court cases that received punitive damages); see also Mervine, supra note 21, at 
1601 (analyzing the history of the judicial crafted category of exemplary or punitive damages). 
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Woodworth, formally recognized the validity of punitive damages as a well-
established principle in American jurisprudence.29 
After receiving approval from the Supreme Court, punitive damages 
began to serve the twin societal aims of retribution and deterrence.30  The 
rationale behind retribution was that the defendant deserved to be punished 
for his or her gross misconduct by paying a special damage award beyond 
just the compensatory damages.31  Similarly, the rationale behind deterrence 
suggested that by punishing the defendant through an exemplary fine, both 
the defendant and society in general would be discouraged from performing 
a similar act.32  Thus, the traditional focus for punitive damages—vis-à-vis 
the twin aims—was to bridge the gap between criminal and tort theory, 
punishing a defendant for the benefit of society.33 
Despite the potential benefits of punitive damages as originally 
purposed, their tenure in United States jurisprudence has not been left 
unscathed by criticism.34  An early example of such court-based exegesis 
 
 29. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) (“It is a well-established principle of 
the common law, that in actions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict 
what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the 
enormity of his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff.”); see BMW of N. 
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (reviewing the 150-year-old decision of Day); Meredith 
Matheson Thoms, Punitive Damages in Texas: Examining the Need for a Split-Recovery Statute, 35 
ST. MARY’S L.J. 207, 210 (2003) (examining early American court cases that involved punitive 
damages). 
 30.  Thoms, supra note 29, at 216. 
 31.  Id. at 214–15. 
 32.  Id. at 216.  But cf. Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: 
The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 463 n.317 (2008) (“I 
disagree, however, that punitive damages may be used to completely ‘deter . . . others . . . from 
similar conduct in the future. . . .’  That might be a welcome side effect of punitive damages, but it 
cannot be a driving force behind them without violating procedural due process.”) (citation omitted). 
 33.  Meulam, supra note 20, at 1119–21.  One scholar has commented on three specific ways in 
which society is benefited from punitive damages: 
[F]irst, unlike predictable damage caps, punitive damages prevent wealthy corporations 
from engaging in cost-benefit analysis with people’s lives; second, punitive damages 
provide an incentive to victims and their attorneys to endure lengthy, draining, and costly 
litigation; and third, they provide victims the control with which to fix the harm. 
Mervine, supra note 21, at 1623. 
 34.  See Kirk v. Denver Publ’g Co., 818 P.2d 262, 276 n.5 (Colo. 1991).  Even in Day, the Court 
recognized that a number of legal scholars had been and were questioning the validity of punitive 
damages in American courts.  Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (1 How.) 363, 371 (1851); see also 
Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119, 121–22 (Colo. 1884) (“[I]t is the aim of civil jurisprudence to mete out 
as nearly exact justice as possible between contending litigants.  There ought to be no disposition to 
take from the defendant or give to the plaintiff more than equity and justice require.  Yet under this 
rule of [punitive] damages these principles are forgotten, and judicial machinery is used for the 
avowed purpose of giving plaintiff that to which he has no shadow of right. . . .  Who will undertake 
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comes from the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which famously decreed, 
“The idea is wrong.  It is a monstrous heresy.  It is an unsightly and an 
unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law.”35  
Likewise, other courts suggested that there was something amiss about 
compensating the plaintiff beyond the level necessary to cure the harm.36  A 
similar lack of synergism between state courts and this legal approach was 
evidenced in Indiana; there, the court reviewed the history of punitive 
damages in America and stated, “The question of exemplary damages is not 
settled beyond dispute. . . .  [T]he rule in the several States is not uniform, 
and amongst text-writers the same difficulty exists. . . .  The doctrine of 
exemplary or punitive damages rests upon a very uncertain and unstable 
basis.”37  As such, many sought to cleanse this unsettled and unsettling 
enigma from the chronicles of the common law.38 
In light of the foregoing, the Supreme Court set out to resolve the 
 
to give a valid reason why plaintiff, after being fully paid for all the injury inflicted upon his 
property, body, reputation, and feelings, should still be compensated, above and beyond, for a wrong 
committed against the public at large?  The idea is inconsistent with sound legal principles, and 
should never have found a lodgment in the law.”). 
 35.  Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 8 n.4 (1991) (quoting Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 
342, 382 (1872)); see Scott Dodson, Assessing the Practicality and Constitutionality of Alaska’s 
Split-Recovery Punitive Damages Statute, 49 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1340 (2000) (discussing early judicial 
controversies with the doctrine of punitive damages).  Not every state court judge, however, thought 
punitive damages were evil.  As evidence of this, the Court in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. 
compared the New Hampshire court’s comment to a comment by a Wisconsin judge in 1914: 
“Speaking for myself only in this paragraph. . . .  The law giving exemplary damages is 
an outgrowth of the English love of liberty regulated by law.  It tends to elevate the jury 
as a responsible instrument of government, discourages private reprisals, restrains the 
strong, influential, and unscrupulous, vindicates the right of the weak, and encourages 
recourse to and confidence in the courts of law by those wronged or oppressed by acts or 
practices not cognizable in or not sufficiently punished by the criminal law.” 
499 U.S. at 8 n.4 (quoting Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18, 19–20 (Wis. 1914)). 
 36.  See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice 
Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991) (“[A] plaintiff is a fortuitous 
beneficiary of a punitive damage award simply because there is no one else to receive it.”) (citations 
omitted); Thoms, supra note 29, at 218–19 (allowing the plaintiff to be the sole recipient of the 
punitive damage award contradictory to the underlying purpose of punitive damages, to benefit the 
public good). 
 37.  Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51, 56–57 (1878); see also Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. 
Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1075 (Wash. 1891) (“[W]e believe that the doctrine of punitive damages is 
unsound in principle, and unfair and dangerous in practice.”); Roose v. Perkins, 2 N.W. 715, 721–22 
(Neb. 1879) (“In law, the party injured, upon being allowed this compensation, has no further claim 
upon the defendant for that injury, therefore he is not entitled to recover more. . . .  The effect 
ordinarily of instructing a jury that they may find exemplary damages is to say to them that in 
estimating damages they need be governed by no rules, be bound by no oath, and that they may 
return a verdict . . . according to their whim or caprice they may deem expedient, without regard to 
the amount of the injury.”). 
 38.  Rabe, supra note 21, at 334–35.  See also Kirk, 818 P.2d at 266 n.5 (examining how the 
Colorado Supreme Court removed punitive damages from its list of available remedies during the 
late nineteenth century). 
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ambiguity over the punitive damage doctrine.39  Although the Court 
acknowledged the state courts’ grievances, it determined that the legal tool 
had become too entrenched in United States common law to be removed.40  
The Court also held, at a later date, that it would only review cases where the 
punitive damages awarded were “so grossly excessive as to amount to a 
deprivation of property without due process of law.”41  So this was the state 
of punitive damages for the next seventy years: reluctantly accepted, 
infrequently used, often struck down by trial courts, rarely reviewed by the 
Supreme Court, and awarded in such nominal amounts as to be 
inconsequential.42  However, punitive damages soon surfaced in a 
monumental manner. 
Spurred by the consumer movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s,43 
American courts began to award punitive damages much more frequently, 
“radically expand[ing their] availability” to misconduct beyond traditional 
intentional torts.44  Additionally, many courts decreased the burden of proof 
needed to prevail in a claim involving punitive damages.45  Yet, the number 
and monetary amount of punitive damage awards remained fairly 
manageable.46 
 
 39.  See infra notes 40–41. 
 40.  Mervine, supra note 21, at 1601 (citing Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 
492 (1875)).  Many courts, such as the Oregon court in Sullivan v. Oregon Railway & Navigation 
Co., 7 P. 508, 515–16 (Or. 1885), agreed that “[i]t would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
give any good reason for” the allowance of punitive damages, yet “it seems to have attached itself to 
our jurisprudence.”  See Rabe, supra note 21, at 335 (indicating that famed nineteenth century legal 
scholars Theodore Sedwick and Simon Greenleaf recognized the oddity of punitive damages; 
however, Sedwick believed the courts and the states should not be removed because punitive 
damages had become a part of American legal tradition). 
 41.  Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909); Rabe, supra note 21, at 335 
(commenting on the Supreme Court’s concern for punitive damages).  This attitude towards punitive 
damages has subsequently been affirmed in more modern Supreme Court cases like TXO 
Productions Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 456 (1993), and BMW of North 
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).  It was not until 1915 that the Supreme Court 
overturned a punitive damage award for being unreasonable and “so plainly arbitrary and oppressive 
as to be nothing short” of a taking in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 491 (1915) (finding a $6,300 exemplary award for not furnishing telephone 
services to be unconstitutional). 
 42.  ROBERT W. HAMMESFAHR & LORIS S. NUGENT, PUNITIVE DAMAGES STATE-BY-STATE 
GUIDE § 1:4 (2011). 
 43.  Id. § 1:5. 
 44.  Schwartz, I’ll Take That, supra note 25, at 528. 
 45.  Id. (explaining how numerous state courts “instituted the ‘triple trigger’ approach of ‘willful, 
wanton, or reckless disregard’” with regard to the burden of proof required for plaintiffs to prove 
punitive damages, while some courts even lowered the standard to “gross negligence”). 
 46.  Mesulam, supra note 20, at 1122 (discussing how punitive damages were slow to find 
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Enter the 1970s and 1980s.47  Predicated upon the foundation laid by 
courts during the 1960s and fueled by their extension into product liability 
claims, punitive damage awards exploded.48  Punitive damages began to be 
awarded at unprecedented levels and in astronomical amounts.49  Although 
some Supreme Court Justices were concerned about the massive “windfall 
recover[ies]”50 plaintiffs were receiving, the Court, for the most part, 
watched as the “[a]wards of punitive damages . . . skyrocket[ed].”51  
Subsequently, the expansion of punitive damages “‘continued and 
accelerated,’ thanks in part to the rise of mass tort litigation,”52 and the 
ensuing two decades saw punitive damage awards continue to escalate.53  It 
 
widespread growth until the 1960s when they became available for unintentional torts). 
 47.  Id.; Schwartz, I’ll Take That, supra note 25, at 528–29 (discussing the evolution of punitive 
damages during this time period); see also Mervine, supra note 21, at 1604 (starting in the late 
1960s, the allowance of lower standards for punitive damages caused punitive damage awards to 
radically expand). 
 48.  Mervine, supra note 21, at 1604.  During this time period, courts gradually became 
cognizant of the complete lack of any mechanism to control punitive damage awards, with any level 
of sanction conceivably serving any legitimate purpose.  John Calvin Jefferies, Jr., A Comment on 
the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 142 (1986).  And as courts saw “a 
system careening out of control . . . unprecedented numbers of punitive awards in product liability 
and other mass tort situations began to surface.  Many of these awards were also unprecedented in 
amount.  And these trends continued and accelerated into the 1980’s.”  Id. 
 49.  Mesulam, supra note 20, at 1122–23. 
 50.  City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 51.  Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Mervine, supra note 21, at 1604 n.95 
(citing multiple Supreme Court decisions during this time period where the Court recognized that 
large punitive damage awards were being administered, but did not see fit to intervene); see also 
Schwartz, Reining in Punitive Damages, supra note 24, at 1003 (“The United States Supreme Court 
has expressed serious concern in recent years that punitive damages awards in this country have ‘run 
wild,’ jeopardizing fundamental constitutional rights.”).  A 1989 commentator also observed that 
“hardly a month goes by without a multimillion-dollar punitive damages verdict in a product liability 
case.”  Malcolm E. Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common Law Development of the Use of 
Punitive Damages in Modern Product Liability Litigation, 40 ALA. L. REV. 919, 919 (1989).  But cf. 
Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. 
REV. 15, 54 (“All [empirical studies] conclude that punitive damages verdicts are rare.”); Stephen 
Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1990) 
(examining the infrequency of punitive damage awards and their manageable size when awarded). 
 52.  Mesulam, supra note 20, at 1122 (quoting Jefferies, supra note 48, at 142). 
 53.  “Until 1987 no punitive award . . . ever exceeded $1 billion, but since then at least nine have 
reached that level.”  Mesulam, supra note 20, at 1123.  An example of a suspect punitive damage 
award in excess of a billion dollars occurred in 1999, when a Los Angeles jury ordered General 
Motors to pay $4.9 billion dollars in punitive damages to six individuals who were injured when a 
drunk driver rear-ended their vehicle.  Schwartz, I’ll Take That, supra note 25, at 531.  Another 
particularly noteworthy cased occurred in 2002 when a jury awarded a single individual—who had 
developed lung cancer from smoking cigarettes—$28 billion in punitive damages.  Bullock v. Philip 
Morris USA, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 140, 151 (Ct. App. 2006), vacated, 159 P.3d 33 (Cal. 2007).  The 
largest reported punitive damage award, $145 billion, was assessed in Engle v. RJ Reynolds 
Tobacco, 94–08273, 2000 WL 33534572 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Nov. 6, 2000), rev’d sub nom. Liggett Group 
Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), aff’d, 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).  See 
HAMMESFAHR, supra note 42 § 1:8 (2011)  (“While the jury’s punitive damage award is the largest 
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was during this era of uncertainty and concern about exorbitant punitive 
damage awards that many proposed reform.54  Additionally, with the rise of 
punitive damages in United State courts, it became necessary to decide what, 
if any, tax liabilities would be implicated. 
B.  Taxation of Punitive Damages 
The Constitution confers upon Congress the ability to lay and collect 
income taxes.55  Taxable income has been defined as “all income from 
whatever source derived.”56  Inherent to the taxing power is “the power to 
select the subjects of taxation, rates, classes of beneficiaries, deductions and 
exemptions, and the power to enact whatever measures are reasonably 
necessary to aid in the assessment and collection of any tax.”57  Furthermore, 
as a legislative function, the power to tax is construed broadly and much 
deference is given to the decisions of Congress.58 
Although Congress’s power to tax is extensive, enacted taxes are subject 
to several constitutional restrictions.59  Moreover, while a number of federal 
taxes have been enacted incident to police power or the power to regulate 
 
ever reported, it is notable that the Supreme Court of Florida found the jury’s verdict to be 
excessive.”). 
 54.  See infra note 73. 
 55.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, § 8. 
 56.  I.R.C. § 61 (2006).  This definition was originally found in I.R.C. § 22(a) (1939), and was 
used by Congress to exert “the full measure of its taxing power.”  Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 
331, 334 (1940). 
 57.  47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 3 (2012).  Therefore, Congress can create a federal monitory 
tax on punitive damages by selecting a rate that would work to prevent plaintiffs’ windfalls.  
Congress has subsequently delegated this power to the “Internal Revenue Service with broad power 
to enforce our revenue laws. . . .  The power to collect, however, is not an unrestricted power.  The 
government must abide by the laws of the United States including constitutional, statutory, and 
decisional constraints against unequal treatment.”  IRS v. Blais, 612 F. Supp. 700, 703–04 (D. Mass. 
1985). 
 58.  In Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949), the Supreme Court defined the 
general rule for taxing income: “The income taxed is described in sweeping terms and should be 
broadly construed in accordance with an obvious purpose to tax income comprehensively.  The 
exemptions, on the other hand, are specifically stated and should be construed with restraint in the 
light of the same policy.” 
 59.  Limitations include a general restriction on the power to tax under the Due Process Clause, 
the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.  47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 3 (2012).  Furthermore, Congress is prohibited 
from imposing non-uniform direct or indirect taxes throughout the United States, and from laying 
any tax on the export of goods.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; id. § 9, cl. 4, 5.  Additionally, Congress 
may tax a particular class of persons if the tax bears a rational relation to a legitimate governmental 
purpose.  Wheeler v. United States, 768 F.2d 1333, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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certain activities, taxes are generally unavailable for strictly regulatory 
purposes.60  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has shown considerable 
deference to federal tax measures, even where the tax is so regulatory that it 
preempts the activity it seeks to control.61  Given these general premises, 
Congress’s power to tax punitive damages has not been questioned,62 yet its 
applicability has been unsettled. 
For many years, the ambiguity that originally shrouded punitive damage 
awards in the United States extended to Congress’s ability to tax punitive 
damages.63  Originally, under the “capital labor” theory, taxable income only 
included income derived from the capital markets, labor, or both.64  Thus, it 
excluded any damages that restored a loss or sought to make a victim 
whole.65  Because punitive damages are “[w]indfall income” in that they are 
not derived from traditional capital or labor expenditures, they were 
generally considered to be exempt from any federal income tax.66 
It was not until the Supreme Court abandoned the “capital or labor” 
requirement in its 1955 decision Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. that 
punitive damages became taxable as gross income.67  However, complete 
 
 60.  47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 3 (2012).  The test that is applied to determine whether a tax 
is an exercise of the taxing power or is merely regulatory is to 
view the objects and purposes of the statute as whole and if from such examination it is 
concluded that revenue is the primary purpose and regulation merely incidental, the 
imposition is a tax and is controlled by the taxing provisions of the Constitution.  
Conversely, if regulation is the primary purpose of statute, the mere fact that incidentally 
revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax, but a sanction imposed for 
the purpose of making effective the congressional enactment. 
Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 994 (6th Cir. 1943). 
 61.  Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CAL. L. REV. 975, 995, 1029 (2011) 
(“Supreme Court doctrine is unclear on the limits of Congress’s ability to use tax penalties to 
regulate.  Although the Court unequivocally stated in several cases decided in the 1920s and 1930s 
that the Constitution forbids Congress from using tax penalties to accomplish what it could not 
accomplish via direct regulation, the precedential value of these cases is unclear.”). 
 62.  2 FEDERAL TAX GUIDE TO LEGAL FORMS § 12:15 (2d ed. 2011). 
 63.  See 2 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 18.1(B) (6th ed. 2010) (reviewing the 
pre-1984 tax treatment of punitive damages in its entirety). 
 64.  Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 417–19 (1913).  Consequently, the 
Revenue Act of 1918 excluded from gross income “[a]mounts received, through accident or health 
insurance or under workmen’s compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, 
plus the amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries 
or sickness.”  O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 85 (1996) (citing Revenue Act of 1918, 40 
Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919)). 
 65.  O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 85–87; see also Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179, 187 (1918); S. 
Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335 (1918) (concluding punitive damages were a restoration of 
capital, and were thus excluded from the definition of taxable income). 
 66.  Douglas A. Kahn, Compensatory and Punitive Damages for A Personal Injury: To Tax or 
Not to Tax?, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 327, 332 (1994). 
 67.  Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431–32 (1955); see 2 JOHN J. KIRCHER & 
CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 14:02 (2000) (“The case of 
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Company . . . has long been interpreted to mandate that all 
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clarity on the taxability of punitive damages did not follow.  Courts around 
the country did not apply Glenshaw Glass Co. to punitive damage awards 
for physical injury or sickness, because they construed the Court’s opinion 
to apply only to fraud and anti-fraud claims.68  Additionally, Internal 
Revenue Code § 104(a)(2) exempted from taxation punitive damages 
awarded for personal injury or sickness.69  This only caused more 
confusion.70  After several decades of conflicting decisions in the Tax Court 
and the Courts of Appeal, however, the Supreme Court finally concluded 
that punitive damages are not excludable from income, even when awarded 
for personal injury.71  Today, punitive damages are considered gross income 
and are subject to a federal income tax of around 50%.72  However, the 
 
punitive damage awards be taxed unless there exists some express statutory exclusion.”).  Pointedly, 
Glenshaw Glass Company—the original beneficiary of the punitive damage award after their anti-
trust case—attempted to characterize the award as “‘windfalls’ flowing from the culpable conduct of 
third parties,” and, thus “not within the scope” of taxable gross income.  Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 
U.S. at 429, 431 (“The mere fact that the payments were extracted from the wrongdoers as 
punishment for unlawful conduct cannot detract from their character as taxable income . . . .”); see 
also Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Tax Consequences of Damages and Settlements, in AM. BAR ASS’N, 
DIVISION FOR PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION PRESENTS A NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DAMAGES, NEW 
SETTLEMENT TECHNIQUES, AND TAX CONSEQUENCES 213, 227–29 (1986) (“A punitive damage 
award in any cause of action should be thought of as a windfall to the taxpayer, because it does not 
compensate for loss.”); James D. Ghiardi, The Federal Taxation of Punitive Damage Awards, 11 J.L. 
& COM. 1, 12–13 (1991) (discussing how punitive damages are considered income for tax liability 
purposes unless they involve physical injury, physical sickness, or wrongful death). 
 68.  Ghiardi, supra note 67, at 12. 
 69.  “Without section 104(a)(2), punitive damages would fall under the broad definition of gross 
income.”  Clay R. Stevens, Killing Two Birds with One Stone: Elimination of the Punitive Damage 
Exemption of Section 104(a)(2) Leads to Greater Efficiency and Raises Revenue, 28 BEVERLY HILLS 
B. ASS’N J. 168, 169 (1994). 
 70.  See Ghiardi, supra note 67, at 2 (noting that the ambiguity surrounding the taxation of 
punitive damages was caused by Internal Revenue Code § 104(a)(2)); James Serven, The Taxation of 
Punitive Damages: Horton Lays an Egg?, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 215, 216 (1995) (analyzing the 
development and application of Internal Revenue Code § 104(a)(2), including relevant case law). 
 71.  I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006); 2 FEDERAL TAX GUIDE TO LEGAL FORMS § 12:15 (2d ed. 2011) 
(citing O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 83 (1996)).  Congress subsequently amended Section 
104(a)(2) to expressly state that punitive damages could not be excluded from tax liability.  
KIRCHER, supra note 67 § 14:01.  Today, punitive damages awarded in wrongful death cases 
represent the most controversial area wherein punitive damages are excluded from federal taxes.  2 
FEDERAL TAX GUIDE TO LEGAL FORMS § 12:15 (citing I.R.C. § 104(c)).  It should also be noted that 
punitive damage payments are currently a deductible expense for businesses and individuals.  
KIRCHER, supra note 67 §§ 14:13, 14:15.  Scholars argue that such exemptions should be removed 
because they work against the twin aims of punishment and deterrence.  See Catherine M. Del 
Castillo, Should Punitive Damages Be Nondeductible? The Expansion of the Public-Policy Doctrine, 
68 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1990). 
 72.  SCHLUETER, supra note 63 § 18.1(C); see KIRCHER, supra note 67 § 14:08 (examining the 
exclusions to the general rule that punitive damages are taxable). 
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taxation of punitive damages has never been used as a governor or curative 
tool for the punitive damage problem; instead, opponents to skyrocketing 
punitive damage awards have adopted alternate controls. 
C.  Modern Reform Measures 
The prevailing perception amongst reformers and courts during the mid-
to-late twentieth century was that rampant punitive damages were wreaking 
havoc upon both the economy and the judicial system.73  Equally important, 
people were concerned about the massive windfalls plaintiffs were 
receiving.74  As such, revisionists articulated several different solutions 
meant to curb the punitive damage dilemma. 
 
 73.  Gary S. Becker, How to Put the Right Cap on Punitive Damages, BUS. WK. N.Y., Sept. 15, 
2003, at 28, available at http://home.uchicago.edu/~gbecker/Businessweek/BW/2003/ 
09_15_2003.pdf (“Excessive punitive damage awards are not harmless transfers of wealth: They 
damage the functioning of the U.S. economy and judicial system.”).  Runaway punitive damages 
threatened the economy because they stemmed “research and development of new products,” 
dramatically increased businesses’ insurance premiums, forced businesses to settle meritless claims 
or risk exposure to immense punitive damage awards, and pressured numerous large companies into 
bankruptcy, thus causing many employees to lose their jobs.  Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco 
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Sales & Cole, supra note 21, at 
1153, 1156–57; David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of 
Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1982) (“[T]he increasing number and size of such 
awards may fairly raise concern for the future stability of American industry.”).  The courts’ 
concerns are derived from the fact that juries are left mostly to their own devices when setting the 
punitive damage amounts, an “important, and potentially devastating, decision.”  Browning-Ferris, 
492 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 74.  The term “plaintiff windfall” is used to denote, in the words of Justice Harlan, “private fines 
levied for purposes that may be wholly unrelated to the circumstances of the actual litigant.”  
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 74 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  In other words, 
“whenever the amount of punitive damages exceeds the plaintiff’s litigation costs,” a windfall in the 
favor of plaintiff results.  Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plantiff’s Windfall from Punitive 
Damage Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900, 1904 (1992) [hereinafter Economic Analysis]. 
Windfalls are problematic because they produce inefficient compensation, encourage risk-seeking 
behavior, and misallocate legal resources.  Id. at 1907.  It can also be said that plaintiff windfalls do 
little to promote the societal good punitive damages were meant to accomplish.  Id. 
  It is true that “conventional economic opinion has . . . long regarded the plaintiff’s windfall 
as a necessary byproduct of adequately deterring the defendant. . . .  [R]ecent scholarship, however, 
has identified two potential inefficiencies associated with windfall awards to plaintiffs: unnecessary 
or frivolous litigation and inadequate precautionary measures undertaken by plaintiffs.”  Catherine 
M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 370–71 (2003); Sales & 
Cole, supra note 21, at 1165 (“Considering the expanded and virtually unlimited access to 
compensatory damages, punitive damages simply provide a windfall to the plaintiff, penalize the 
innocent consumers or society, and unnecessarily sap the vitality of the economy upon which society 
is totally dependent.”).  Given the negative treatment of plaintiff windfalls, the law should prevent 
their occurrence. 
  Connecticut has made one of the best attempts at reforming punitive damages to eliminate 
plaintiffs’ windfalls.  There, a plaintiff may only recover the amount of his or her actual litigation, 
minus taxable costs.  Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 222 A.2d 220 (Conn. 1966).  In this 
way, Connecticut strikes at the cause of the windfalls.  However, this Comment favors an alternative 
regulatory tool because the Connecticut rule does not seek to punish the defendant, one of the 
07 SANDERS SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/13  3:23 PM 
[Vol. 40: 785, 2013] Uncle Sam and the Partitioning Punitive Problem 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
799 
The most radical of the proposed measures was the complete 
abandonment of punitive damages.  Federal law delegates broad discretion 
to state legislatures in authorizing and limiting punitive damage awards.75  
As such, some states—going back to the nineteenth century—have banned 
punitive damages either in specific instances or in their entirety.76  Even so, 
abolishment has not been widely used.  Most jurisdictions recognize some 
beneficial purpose served by punitive damages or remain convinced—like 
the Supreme Court of yesteryear—that punitive damages are too firmly 
entrenched in the common law to truly be eradicated.77 
Although few states have explicitly banned punitive damages, numerous 
states have placed caps on them.  In the 1980s, monetary caps were one of 
the first retorts issued against punitive damages.78  There are two types of 
caps.  Some courts use a hard cap—a maximum set amount that the law will 
allow for a punitive damage recovery.79  Other state legislatures set the 
 
primary purposes of punitive damages.  See LeBlanc v. Spector, 378 F. Supp. 301, 305 (D. Conn. 
1973) (“‘[P]unitive’ damages in Connecticut serve a compensatory function limited by plaintiff’s 
actual costs, rather than a punitive function which computes damages in terms of the wantonness of 
defendant’s conduct.”). 
 75.  See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). 
 76.  Kirk v. Denver Publ’g Co., 818 P.2d 262, 276 n.5 (Colo. 1991).  Nebraska courts have 
completely banned punitive damages.  1 JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:9 (2d ed. 2011).  Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
and Washington have banned punitive damages unless explicitly authorized by statute.  Id. §§ 4:7, 
4:8, 4:10, 4:11.  Additionally, eight states have specifically banned punitive damages with regard to 
certain causes of action.  ALA. CODE § 6-11-26 to 27 (2011) (statutory prohibition on punitive 
damages against any state agency); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (2011) (punitive damages not 
allowed in administrative proceedings or arbitration); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115 
(LexisNexis 2012) (prohibition on punitive damages in legal or medical malpractice actions); 745 id. 
10/2-102 (LexisNexis 2012) (prohibition on punitive damages against public officials); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. 60-3701 (West 2011) (use of punitive damages banned against drug manufacturer); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 27-1-220 (2011) (punitive damages not allowed in contract and breach of contract 
claims); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C) (LexisNexis 2012) (punitive damages banned against 
drug manufacturers); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31.740, 30.927 (West 2011) (punitive damages 
prohibited with regard to medical claims and drug manufacturers); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-12A-7 
(LexisNexis 2011) (punitive damages not allowed in civil lawsuits against a political subdivision or 
public employee). 
 77.  Thoms, supra note 29, at 223; see also supra note 40.  Many professionals and scholars still 
find that punitive damages serve a “vital means of punishing and deterring wrongful conduct,” 
thereby providing a mechanism to a judicial system that lacks the ability to punish defendants who 
engage in conduct that society will not tolerate, but which falls outside the bounds of criminal law.  
Goldstein, supra note 21, at 105; see also DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY § 18:6 (3d ed., 2000) [hereinafter OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY] (noting that most people, 
including non-attorneys, tag punitive damages as a valuable tool for punishing severe malfeasance). 
 78.  Thoms, supra note 29, at 221. 
 79.  See Schwartz, I’ll Take That, supra note 25, at 533 (explaining how states like Kansas use a 
punitive damages system that limits the award amount to the lesser of $5 million or the defendant’s 
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punitive damage amount as an arranged multiple of the compensatory 
damages.80  A majority of states use both types of caps.81  The Supreme 
Court, on the other hand, has consistently rejected the notion that punitive 
damages can be measured by “a simple mathematical formula.”82  The Court 
bases its argument on the observation that where compensatory damages are 
low but conduct is particularly repulsive, a set multiplier may result in 
defendants paying only nominal damages.83  In such circumstances, the 
purpose of punitive damages to punish and deter the defendant from similar 
conduct is severely circumscribed.84 
 
annual gross income) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(e) (1994)); ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (2011) 
(affixing a $500,000 cap to punitive damages with minimal exceptions).  See also infra note 84 and 
accompanying text. 
 80. Schwartz, I’ll Take That, supra note 25, at 533; Thoms, supra note 29, at 222 (discussing 
how states have capped punitive damages, generally using a fixed multiplier of compensatory 
damages); see infra note 84 and accompanying text; see, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(3)(a) 
(2011) (statutorily mandated scale capping punitive damages according to defendant’s net worth); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (LexisNexis 2011) (cap on punitive damages of twice the 
compensatory damages). 
 81.  OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 77; see also, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604 
(2011) (“No judgment for punitive damages shall exceed the greater of two hundred fifty thousand 
dollars ($250,000) or an amount which is three (3) times the compensatory damages contained in 
such judgment.”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-11 (2011) (“[T]he amount of exemplary 
damages may not exceed two times the amount of compensatory damages or two hundred fifty 
thousand dollars, whichever is greater.”). 
 82.  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996).  And it is not just the Supreme 
Court that believes this.  Multiple commentators “have criticized caps and ratios, however, for 
undermining the punishment and deterrence effects of punitive damages, while still allowing the 
plaintiff to reap a windfall gain.”  Dodson, supra note 35, at 1336.  The best thing that can be said 
about a punitive cap is that there are low administrative costs—but even then, “this virtue comes 
with a vice: If the cap is too low, it will prevent large judgments that are entirely justified.”  Cass R. 
Sunstein, What Should Be Done?, in CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES 
DECIDE 242, 256–57 (2002) (discussing the benefits and problems with modern punitive damage 
reforms).  The Court reaffirmed its reluctance to set a constitutional cap to punitive damages in State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 410 (2003), and “[b]ecause 
there are no rigid benchmarks, ratios greater than” ten to one may still be upheld unless they are so 
grossly excessive as to constitute a taking in violation of defendant’s due process of law.  And 
although the Court refuses to set a specific ratio to which punitive damages should be awarded, it 
acceded in State Farm, “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages will satisfy due process.”  Id.; see also Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion for 
Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of Punitive Damage Awards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L. 
REV. 61, 87 (1992) (discussing how the capping of punitive damage awards is an inefficient remedy 
to prevent plaintiff windfalls because each defendant’s wealth is different, and, as such, a low cap 
may prevent a particularly wealthy defendant from being deterred from similarly repugnant conduct 
in the future). 
 83.  BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 582. 
 84.  See id.  In light of the aforementioned, it is a wonder that a large number of states use 
identical statutory language to cap punitive damage awards: “If willful and malicious 
misappropriation exists, the court may award exemplary damages in an amount not exceeding twice 
the award made under [the compensatory damages] section.”  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-53 
(West 2011); D.C. CODE § 36-403 (LexisNexis 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-763 (2011); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 482B-4 (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, § 1544 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., COM. 
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Another of the more popular restrictions placed upon punitive damages 
has been to increase the requisite burden of proof.  Most states have chosen 
to apply a “clear and convincing evidence” standard, and the Supreme Court 
suggested in dicta that this is the correct standard.85  Raising the burden of 
proof was meant to serve two goals: first, to limit the jury’s ability to award 
punitive damages to cases involving egregious conduct; second, to “permit 
closer scrutiny of the evidence by trial judges and reviewing courts.”86  
Moreover, by increasing the requisite evidentiary standard, the jury is 
 
LAW § 11-1203 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3A-4 (West 2011); 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
5304 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-41-3 (West 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-29-3 
(2011); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 47-22-3 (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-24-103 (West 2011).  
Moreover, additional states employ a derivation or alteration of the above double ratio standard.  
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104 (2011) (“Punitive or exemplary damages shall not exceed 
an amount equal to the greater of: (A) Two (2) times the total amount of compensatory damages 
awarded; or (B) Five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).”).  Both types of caps, as pointed out by 
the Supreme Court, seem ineffective or counterintuitive to the twin aims of punitive damages—
punishment and deterrence—when compensatory damages are low.  BMW of N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. 
at 580–81.  It also seems the states that use split-recovery statutes possess this same ideology.  See, 
e.g., Northrup v. Miles Homes, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 850, 861 (Iowa 1973) (In a case involving a 
relatively nominal amount of actual damages, the court held, “Exemplary damages are intended to 
punish the defendant and deter others from similar wrongdoing. . . .  To be effective in this purpose 
the exemplary damages awarded must be relatively large.”).  The double ratio standard limits the 
aforementioned goal when actual damages are small. 
 85.  See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 n.11, 58 (1991) (suggesting that within 
the context of civil cases, due process concerns will not be raised by using a standard less than “clear 
and convincing evidence” or, even, “beyond a reasonable doubt”); Schwartz, I’ll Take That, supra 
note 25, at 531 (“[This] standard has also been recommended by the American Bar Association, the 
American College of Trial Lawyers, and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws.”); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE 
STATES (June 2004) [hereinafter EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM], available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/ 
default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5549/report.pdf (outlining the limits on punitive damages 
since 1985, including most states increasing the burden of proof for punitive damages to clear and 
convincing evidence).  This stands in contrast to the report of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science and Transportation given in 1986, where the Committee identified that most states were 
using a “preponderance of the evidence.” 1 KIRCHER, supra note 76 § 9:10. 
  For the jurisdictions that have adopted the clear and convincing evidence standard, some 
have done so “in light of the ‘quasi-criminal’ nature of punitive damages.”  Benjamin C. Zipursky, A 
Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 106 (2005).  The explanation for this practice 
arises from courts’ belief that punitive damages are analogous to a criminal fine, and, as such, should 
approximate a higher burden of proof.  Id.  Additionally, while most jurisdictions have adopted a 
higher burden of proof—clear and convincing evidence or even proof beyond a reasonable doubt—
some courts “continue to adhere to the traditional ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard.  Most 
often, courts in these jurisdictions have based their conclusions on the absence of legal authority 
suggesting that anything more is required of a civil plaintiff than factual proof of a claim by a 
‘preponderance of the evidence.’”  1 KIRCHER, supra note 76 § 9:10. 
 86.  Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 499 U.S. at 58 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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reminded that it should be highly confident of the evidence before awarding 
punitive damages.87 
In some states, a byproduct of this heightened standard has been the 
bifurcated trial.88  “In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury first resolves the 
issue of compensatory damages before determining the amount of punitive 
damages, if any, to be paid the defendant.”89  By separating the 
compensatory and punitive damage awards, “jurors are better able to 
separate the burden of proof that is required for compensatory damage 
awards from a heightened burden of proof for punitive damages.”90  Even so, 
when punitive damages are awarded, an increased burden of proof or 
bifurcated trial does nothing to prevent a plaintiff’s windfall.91  As such, 
split-recovery statutes have been offered as another novel solution to the 
problem. 
III.  SPLIT-RECOVERY STATUTES 
A.  History and Purpose of Split-Recovery Statutes 
Starting in 1985, states began to propagate what have become known as 
split-recovery statutes.92  Split-recovery statutes provide for some percentage 
of the punitive damage award to go to the state, a state agency, a statutorily 
specified fund, or a fund of the plaintiff’s choosing, rather than entirely to 
the plaintiff and his or her attorney.93  The percentage and distribution of a 
 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  See EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM, supra note 85. 
 89.  Schwartz, I’ll Take That, supra note 25, at 533. 
 90.  Id. at 533–34. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Dodson, supra note 35, at 1337. 
 93.  See Goldstein, supra note 21, at 106 (giving a brief description of what punitive damages are 
and what they seek to accomplish); Schwartz, I’ll Take That, supra note 25, at 534–38 (explaining 
how split-recovery statutes are formed, how they differ from state to state, and some of the problems 
they face); Benjamin F. Evans, “Split-Recovery” Survives: The Missouri Supreme Court Upholds 
the State’s Power to Collect One-Half of Punitive Damage Awards, 63 MO. L. REV. 511, 511–12 
(1998) (split-recovery statutes represent a popular method for how to mitigate the punitive damages 
problem).  As summarized by one author: 
[S]ociety could put punitive damages awards to better use than allowing individual civil 
plaintiffs windfall recoveries.  For instance, the State could deposit the money into its 
general treasury.  The funds could then be used directly to regulate the misconduct for 
which the punitive damages were assessed, thus more directly deterring such misconduct, 
or the funds could be used to relieve the tax burden on all the state’s taxpayers.  
Alternatively, society could create a special fund for a deserving cause-possibly a cause 
related to the reason punitive damages were assessed (such as a tort victims’ relief fund) 
or one otherwise needing funds (such as a school fund).  The state need not limit those 
benefiting from punitive damages to one class of citizens—civil plaintiffs. 
E. Jeffrey Grube, Punitive Damages: A Misplaced Remedy, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 839, 854 (1993) 
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state’s punitive damage apportionment differs from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.94 
Within the first two years of the doctrine’s inception, four states adopted 
split-recovery statutes.95  Subsequently, nine additional jurisdictions 
embraced the legal theory.96  Today, eight different states retain some form 
of split-recovery statute.97 
 
(footnotes omitted); see also Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 83, 154 (2007) (“Such apportionment is necessary to address concerns of plaintiff ‘windfalls’ 
and ensure that any punitive damages awarded based on ‘wrongs’ to the public go to the public.”). 
  A few courts have refused to enforce their state’s split-recovery statute where the statute did 
not identify a fund that was capable of distributing the punitive damage award.  Eulrich v. Snap-On 
Tools Corp., 798 P.2d 715 (Or. 1990), superseded by statute, OR. LAWS, ch. 862, § 1 (1991), as 
recognized in Patton v. Target Corp., 242 P.3d 611 (Or. 2010).  In light of the foregoing, some states 
with split-recovery statutes have been constantly concerned with keeping the state’s punitive damage 
portion separate from the general state fund.  See, e.g., Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 
N.W.2d 854, 868–69 (Iowa 1994) (“We find a clear distinction between the Fund and the general 
state treasury.  The damage awards are not commingled with state revenues and are to be disbursed 
only for the purposes of indigent civil litigation programs or insurance assistance programs.”) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  On the other hand, some state legislatures have left 
it up to the judiciary to determine the state’s portion of the split-recovery and where that portion 
should go.  See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2–1207 (West 2007) (“[The] trial court may also in its 
discretion, apportion the punitive damage award among the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s attorney and the 
State of Illinois Department of Human Services.”).  In one instance, a judge directed the plaintiff to 
pay a portion of his punitive damage award to a charity of his choosing.  Dardinger v. Anthem Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 144–46 (Ohio 2002).  But some critics insist that while a state 
legislature may have the power to enact a split-recovery statute, the judiciary should not be allowed 
to redirect a punitive damages award.  Mervine, supra note 21, at 1617; Jessica Nielsen, Note, A 
True Hollywood Story: Alternative Distributions and the Ohio Supreme Court’s Dardinger v. 
Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 815 (2003). 
  Such was the case in Alabama, where the State Supreme Court formulated, in Life Insurance 
Co. of Georgia v. Johnson, 684 So. 2d 685, 698 (Ala. 1996), its own judicial split-recovery clause, 
allocating a portion of the plaintiff’s $5 million punitive damage award to the state’s general fund.  
Mervine, supra note 21, at 1612–13.  After the Supreme Court effectuated its three prong test to 
measure punitive damages in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), however, 
the Supreme Court of Alabama terminated the split-recovery program, determining that the new test 
prohibited plaintiffs from receiving a windfall, and, thus, that the split-recovery clause was no longer 
needed.  Life Ins. Co. of Ga., 701 So. 2d at 535; Mervine, supra note 21, at 1613–14.  In light of the 
foregoing, it is interesting to note that the current Alabama punitive damage statute specifically 
prohibits any portion of a punitive damage award from being infringed upon by the state: “No 
portion of a punitive damage award shall be allocated to the state or any agency or department of the 
state.”  ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(1) (2011). 
 94.  See supra note 93 and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix A. 
 95.  Act of May 16, 1986, 1986 Colo. Sess. Laws 675 (repealed 1995); Act of June 26, 1986, 
1986 Fla. Laws 749 (repealed 1997); Act of May 22, 1986, 1986 Iowa Acts 313 (codified with 
amendments at IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (West 1998)); Act of April 26, 1985, 1985 Kan. Sess. 
Laws 951, 953 (repealed 1988). 
 96.  Act of May 9, 1997 Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 5 (codified at ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.020(j) 
(2003)); Tort Reform Act of 1987, 1987 Ga. Laws 915 (codified with amendments at GA. CODE 
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From their inception, split-recovery statutes were promoted as a 
mechanism for vindicating the rights of society in general—bringing some 
of the punitive damage award back to the public—while still allowing the 
plaintiff to personally collect some of the punitive damage award and so be 
fully compensated or cover legal fees.98  Importantly, the statutes acted to 
mitigate the plaintiff’s windfall recovery.99  And by encouraging a more 
“judicious allocation of resources,”100 split-recovery statutes aligned with the 
Supreme Court’s long-held axiom that punitive damages are meant to 
 
ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1999)); Act of March 6, 1988, 1995 Ill. Laws 507 (codified at 735 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (West 1997)); 1998 Ind. Acts 317 (codified at IND. CODE ANN. § 34-
51-3-6 (LexisNexis 2007)); 1996 Mo. Laws 869 § C (codified at MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.675(3) 
(West 2000)); Act of April 10, 1992, 1992 N.Y. Laws 2286; Act of July 17, 1987, 1987 Or. Laws 
1570, 1571 (codified with amendments at OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540 (Supp. 1996)); An Act Relating 
to Punitive Damages, 1989 Utah Laws 717 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (1996)).  
Additionally, New Jersey, Indiana, and Texas have also considered enacting split-recovery statutes.  
See Matthew J. Klaben, Split-Recovery Statutes: The Interplay of the Takings and Excessive Fines 
Clauses, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 104, 111 (1994) (citing Andrew Blum, Three More Join Trend: States 
Want Share of Punitives, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 8, 1993, at 3).  At the federal level, in 1994, the Senate 
Mainstream Coalition even proposed a split-recovery statute that would require 75% of health care 
malpractice punitive damage awards be paid to the state to fund licensing, disciplinary, and quality 
assurance programs.  Id. at 106 n.14 (citing Senate Mainstream Coalition’s “Proposed Agreement” 
on Health Care Reform, Dated Aug. 22, 1994, 1994 Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. 162, at d57 
(Aug. 24, 1994)). 
 97.  The state legislatures in California, Florida, Kansas, and New York allowed their split-
recovery statutes to expire without renewal.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294.5 (Deering 2004) (expired 
2006); FLA. STAT. ANN § 768.73(2) (West 1993) (expired 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402 
(2004) (expired 1989); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8701 (McKinney 1992) (expired 1994). 
 98.  Mervine, supra note 21, at 1605.  Some courts have approved the state’s use of split-
recovery statutes because the goal of punitive damages is to punish defendants who have wronged 
society and split-recovery statutes properly allocate the award back to society.  Ford v. Uniroyal 
Goodrich Tire Co., 476 S.E.2d 565 (Ga. 1996). 
 99.  Schwartz, I’ll Take That, supra note 25, at 534.  Such a sentiment has been popularized 
throughout the judicial system.  Some scholars, however, have argued against this so-called windfall 
myth, contending that in many instances punitive damages provide the only means for plaintiffs to 
fully recover expenses sustained through litigation.  See Goldstein, supra note 21, at 107 (arguing 
that the windfall myth should be dispelled).  But see supra note 74 and accompanying text 
(describing how plaintiffs’ windfalls are harmful to the judicial system).  It is for this very reason 
that many states that use split-recovery statutes allow attorneys’ fees to be taken from the punitive 
damage award before the award is split between the trier of fact and the state or specific fund.  See 
infra note 215 and accompanying text.  Other commentators have postulated, “[A]n award of full 
punitive damages to the plaintiff serves to deter future harm as fully as an award that splits the 
punitive damages between the state and the plaintiff.”  Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 
1075 (Alaska 2002) (Bryner, J., dissenting).  Therefore, these critics find that split-recovery statutes 
only jam the rudder instead of steering punitive damages back to their original aims of punishment 
and deterrence in the name of societal benefit.  Id.  This is a circular argument.  Admittedly, a 
defendant will still be punished and deterred if the punitive damage award goes to plaintiff alone.  
Scholars have yet to decide how a society is benefited by the punitive damage award going to one 
person rather than being divided between an individual and the state or specified public fund 
representative of the general populace. 
 100.  Clay R. Stevens, Split-Recovery: A Constitutional Answer to the Punitive Damages 
Dilemma, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 857, 869–70 (1994). 
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service the public good, not to compensate the plaintiff.101  Moreover, “[b]y 
creating the proper level of incentive for plaintiffs to bring worthy claims,” 
split-recovery statutes refocused punitive damages on the original twin aims 
of punishment and deterrence.102  Still, split-recovery statutes have been met 
with vigorous criticism.103 
B.  Main Constitutional Challenges to Split-Recovery Statutes 
Despite the benefits of split-recovery statutes,104 critics have argued 
fervently against their adoption and application.  Some have challenged the 
practice as nothing more than a tool to “pad[] states’ budgets while 
eviscerating the plaintiff’s autonomy,” or have argued that such statutes are 
guilty of blurring the “line between criminal and civil law.”105  Other 
 
 101.  See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 293 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (returning to the genesiacal days of punitive 
damages in England, the award was “not meant to compensate the injured plaintiff, but rather to 
punish the wrongdoer and express society’s displeasure at the improper act”).  By requiring the 
punitive damage award to be split between the plaintiff and the state, many courts looked at split-
recovery statutes “as a way to maintain adequate levels of deterrence and punishment for the 
defendant while reducing [a] plaintiff[‘s] windfall from lawsuits and providing funds for the public’s 
benefit.”  Recent Case, Eighth Amendment—Punitive Damages—Florida Supreme Court Upholds 
“Split Recovery” Statute.—Gordon v. State, 608  So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam), 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 1691, 1691 (1993) [hereinafter Recent Case].  This is consistent with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
belief that plaintiffs should only be awarded compensatory damages: 
Punitive damages are generally seen as a windfall to plaintiffs, who are entitled to receive 
full compensation for their injuries—but no more.  Even assuming that a punitive ‘fine’ 
should be imposed after a civil trial, the penalty should go to the State, not to the 
plaintiff—who by hypothesis is fully compensated. 
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Moreover, going back to the 
earlier days of the legal theory, “some of the critics of the doctrine of punitive damages regret the 
state’s loss of a source of income through the diversion of penalties to private plaintiffs.”  Clarence 
Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177 n.7 (1931).  As such, some 
states have viewed split-recovery statutes as a way to raise revenue.  The 2004 California split-
recovery statute explicitly stated that it was enacted due to “extraordinary and dire budgetary needs.”  
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294.5 (Deering 2004) (expired 2006); see also McBride v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
737 F. Supp. 1563, 1568 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (court stated that one reason why the state legislature 
enacted a split-recovery statute was due to an “interest [in] generating revenue”).  Despite any 
feelings of impropriety, a revenue-raising motive by the states does not affect the fact that split-
recovery statutes, at their core, seek to limit plaintiff windfalls by giving excess money resulting 
from the litigation back to society.  See supra note 74.  However, Excessive Fines Clause concerns 
may be raised where the state government seeks to raise revenue through the courts.  See infra notes 
133–38 and accompanying text. 
 102.  Stevens, supra note 100, at 862 n.38. 
 103.  See infra Part III.B. 
 104.  See supra notes 92–103 (reviewing the history and purpose of split-recovery statutes). 
 105.  Mervine, supra note 21, at 1617–18.  Some critics fear that by allowing punitive damages to 
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“commentators fear that allowing the state to become ‘free riders’ on the 
backs of the plaintiffs, will limit plaintiffs’ abilities to secure representation 
and to be afforded justice.”106  The most prolific contention arising against 
split-recovery statutes, however, has been that they are unable to overcome 
significant constitutional challenges.107  Such challenges manifest in two 
 
become additional revenue for a government, lawmakers and judges may loosen restrictions on 
punitive damages to make them easier to recover.  Goldstein, supra note 21, at 108 (ensuring 
punitive damages will be used for a broader societal good leads to conspicuous motivation for judges 
and juries); Schwartz, I’ll Take That, supra note 25, at 540 (because state court judges are elected, 
they have added incentive to produce judgments that give money back to their constituents).  
However, precautions can be taken not to instruct juries about the allocation—in fact, multiple cases 
have held that instructions to the jury regarding the function of a split-recovery statute can be 
reversible error.  See infra note 215.  Furthermore, if court-appointed judges cannot be trusted to 
uphold justice in a detached and ethical matter, there are greater problems with their appointment 
than any self-interest split-recovery statutes may provide.  See generally Lara A. Bazelon, Putting 
the Mice in Charge of the Cheese: Why Federal Judges Cannot Always Be Trusted to Police 
Themselves and What Congress Can Do About It, 97 KY. L.J. 439 (2009) (examining judges 
misallocation of rights between the plaintiff and defendant).  The same can be said to the argument 
that judges may be swayed to deliver inflated damage awards out of sympathy to the plaintiff.  Id.  
With regard to the argument that split-recovery statutes blur the line between criminal and civil law, 
as indicated in Part II.A, the original purpose of punitive damages was to bridge the gap between 
criminal and civil punishments.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  Therefore, this argument 
appears hollow in light of the original twin aims of punitive damages—punishment and deterrence.  
Id.  Finally, why should other people benefit when it is the plaintiff who is injured by the defendant’s 
malfeasance, files the case, and has to endure the hardships of trial?  An expert provided a well-
articulated reason: 
Although the public’s claim to a punitive award is greatest where the actions that gave 
rise to that award are indiscriminately directed at society as a whole, the public 
nevertheless has a valid claim even where the actions are directed at only one person.  In 
the criminal context, crimes are no less crimes against society just because they are 
directed at one individual.  Similarly, in the context of punitive damages, the public has a 
claim to the punitive debt that the malicious tortfeasor owes to society as a result of 
outrageous acts against some of its members. 
Klaben, supra note 96, at 115 n.70.  Therefore, because society is also a victim of the defendant’s 
actions, the public has a valid claim to any damages set aside to punish and deter the defendant. 
 106.  Mervine, supra note 21, at 1618.  Proponents of split-recovery statutes argue that no such 
result occurs, particularly where the statute permits the attorneys’ fees to be commensurate to the 
entire punitive damage amount.  See infra note 215 and accompanying text.  As summarized by one 
bankruptcy court, 
[T]he fact that 60 percent of any punitive damage award must be paid to the state . . . 
does not support disallowance of punitive damages across the board.  Debtor argues that, 
because claimants would receive only approximately 10 percent of any punitive damage 
award (after payment to the state, to the claimant’s attorney, and taxes), there would be 
little or no economic benefit of such damages to the claimants.  The purpose of punitive 
damages is not to provide an economic benefit to claimants, however; the purpose of 
punitive damages is to deter and punish the wrong-doer.  Any economic benefit to the 
claimants is not relevant to those purposes. 
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 339 B.R. 215, 228 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006) 
(citation omitted). 
 107.  See Rabe, supra note 21, at 343–51 (analyzing the constitutional challenges brought against 
split-recovery statutes); Schwartz, I’ll Take That, supra note 25, at 551–56 (addressing constitutional 
questions regarding split-recovery law). 
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primary forms: violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and the 
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.108 
1.  Takings Clause 
Perhaps the most vibrant constitutional challenge levied against split-
recovery statutes has been that they violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.109  Under the Fifth Amendment, “private property [shall not] be 
 
 108.  See Rabe, supra note 21, at 344–48 (specifically commenting on the Excessive Fines Clause 
and Takings Clause); Evans, supra note 93, at 520–27 (addressing the takings, due process, equal 
protection, and excessive fines issues); Stevens, supra note 100, at 872–90 (reviewing the 
constitutionality of split-recovery statutes).  While the “two horns of a constitutional dilemma,” 
Recent Case, supra note 101, at 1694, occupies the bulk of cases challenging split-recovery statutes, 
alternative ancillary arguments have intermittently arisen in different courts; these include violations 
of the Equal Protection Clause, Double Jeopardy, and Due Process. 
  The only context wherein a split-recovery statute would raise constitutional concern under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause—which prohibits a state from treating 
similarly situated individuals differently under the law—is where the statute treats plaintiffs or types 
of cases differently.  Paul F. Kirgis, Note, The Constitutionality of State Allocation of Punitive 
Damage Awards, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 843, 856 n.90 (1993).  While the former is never really 
at issue, the latter situation does arise, as some states only apply split-recovery statutes to certain 
types of recovery.  See Stevens, supra note 100, at 882 n.174 (“[M]aking the split-recovery statute 
applicable only when the plaintiff was not the intended recipient of the defendant’s conduct.”).  
However, if the narrow application of a split-recovery statute can withstand judicial scrutiny under a 
rational basis test—where the court determines it is in the best interest of the state—”courts have 
given almost unlimited deference to the judgment of the state legislature.”  Kirgis, supra, at 856 
n.90. 
  With regard to the argument that split-recovery statutes violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, 
the Fifth Amendment prevents “any person [from] be[ing] subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 
317 U.S. 537, 548–49 (1943), the Supreme Court held that civil actions may implicate the protection 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause if they are punitive or vindictive in nature.  Although the Court in 
that case did not address whether its analysis would be applicable to split-recovery statutes, the 
argument follows that when the state apportions part of the punitive damage award, it subjects the 
defendant to repeated and excessive litigation.  Dodson, supra note 35, at 1359–60.  Yet, because 
punitive damages are already being paid to the plaintiff, any allocation of those damages does not 
subject the defendant to multiple or excessive litigation.  See Stevens, supra note 100, at 885–86 
(noting that due to the ambiguity and noted indifference of the Court to apply the abovementioned 
analysis to split-recovery statutes, it is probable a court would not find a split-recovery statute to 
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause).  For an analysis of the constitutionality of split-recovery 
statutes with regard to Due Process limitations see infra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 109.  See, e.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 1001–04 (9th Cir. 2007); Evans v. 
State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1058 (Alaska 2002); Kirk v. Denver Publ’g Co., 818 P.2d 262, 267–73 (Colo. 
1991); Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 801–02 (Fla. 1992); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 
S.E.2d 635, 639–40 (Ga. 1993); Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467, 472–75 (Ind. 2003); 
DeMendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232, 1245–48 (Or. 2002); Smith v. Price Dev. Co., 125 P.2d 945, 
949–50 (Utah 2005); Rabe, supra note 21, at 347–48; Schwartz, I’ll Take That, supra note 25, at 
552–53; Dodson, supra note 35, at 1362–66. 
07 SANDERS SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/13  3:23 PM 
 
808 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”110  Opponents of split-
recovery statutes argue that when a state takes a portion of the punitive 
damage award and applies it to a general or specified public fund, the state 
unjustly deprives the plaintiff of his or her private property without 
compensation.111  To conclude that a split-recovery statute operates as an 
unconstitutional taking, however, a court must first determine whether a 
punitive damage award is considered property.112 
The term “property” denotes anything that can be subjected to an 
ownership interest, both tangible and intangible, as well as any interests that 
might have value to the owner.113  Since the late nineteenth century, the 
Supreme Court has held that rights affixed by a judgment are protectable 
under the Takings Clause.114  Therefore, once a plaintiff secures a properly 
vested interest in a damage award during the litigation process, any 
diminution of that award by the state is unconstitutional.115 
Of the numerous cases brought before tribunals throughout the country 
alleging that split-recovery statutes violate the Fifth Amendment, two state 
courts have found their respective states’ statutes to be unconstitutional.116  
Employing the same reasoning and analysis, both the Colorado and Utah 
supreme courts held that their state’s split-recovery statute violated the 
Takings Clause because the state’s interest in the punitive damage award 
only vested once the award had been properly transferred to the plaintiff.117  
Therefore, the statutes were invalid.118 
In Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., the Colorado Supreme Court 
undertook an “‘ad hoc, factual’ analysis” of the state’s split-recovery statute 
and concluded that the statute effectuated a “forced taking” of the plaintiff’s 
“property interest in the judgment.”119  To reach this conclusion, the court 
 
 110.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Additionally, the Takings Clause is meant to prohibit the 
“[g]overnment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 
104, 123 (1978). 
 111.  See Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1002; Evans, 56 P.3d at 1058; Kirk, 818 P.2d at 264–65; 
Cheatham, 789 N.E.2d at 470; Smith, 125 P.3d at 948; Rabe, supra note 21, at 348; Dodson, supra 
note 35, at 1362–63. 
 112.  Kirk, 818 P.2d at 267. 
 113.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1252 (8th ed. 1999). 
 114.  McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123–24 (1898).  Unlike real property or personal 
property, a damage award does not belong to the plaintiff, or vest in the plaintiff, until the jury has 
awarded it to him or her.  Id. 
 115.  Id.; Kirk, 818 P.2d at 268 (concluding that once an punitive damage award becomes “vested 
by a judgment,” “[i]t is not within the power of a legislature to take away”) (emphasis added). 
 116.  Kirk, 818 P.2d 262; Smith, 125 P.3d 945. 
 117.  The statute purported to vest the state’s interest in the punitive damage award only after the 
judgment had been paid to the plaintiff.  Kirk, 818 P.2d at 264; Smith, 125 P.3d at 950. 
 118.  Kirk, 818 P.2d at 272–73; Smith, 125 P.3d at 953. 
 119.  Kirk, 818 P.2d at 264, 268 (looking at such factors as economic impact and the 
07 SANDERS SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/13  3:23 PM 
[Vol. 40: 785, 2013] Uncle Sam and the Partitioning Punitive Problem 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
809 
looked at the statute, which affirmatively disavowed “any interest in the 
claim for exemplary damages or in the litigation itself at any time prior to 
payment becoming due.”120  Precisely because the statute specifically 
articulated that the state did not acquire an interest in the punitive damage 
award until after the plaintiff secured the award, the punitive damages had 
already become the plaintiff’s property by the time the state’s statute 
perpetrated the taking.121  By taking the award once it had vested in the 
plaintiff, the statute—through its own verbiage—functioned contrary to the 
Fifth Amendment.122 
Relying on the decision in Kirk, the Utah Supreme Court analyzed its 
own split-recovery statute.123  It quickly noted, “It is significant that the 
[Utah] provision contains no language making the State a party to the . . . 
action or a judgment creditor in the . . . punitive damages award.”124  
Pursuant to such language, the statute only applied once the punitive damage 
judgment had been awarded and paid to the plaintiff.125  Accordingly, the 
state had “no interest whatsoever in the underlying judgment,” and an 
apportionment of the punitive damage award could only take place once the 
judgment had properly vested in the plaintiff, thus resulting in enmity 
between the taking and the Fifth Amendment.126 
To bolster the proposition that split-recovery statutes violate the Takings 
Clause, plaintiffs, courts, and critics have turned to Webb’s Fabulous 
 
government’s interference with a reasonable economic expectation).  The court also looked to see if 
the statute could be categorized as a tax.  Id. at 270.  After the court determined the statute did “not 
satisfy the criteria for an ad valorem property tax,” it determined that the only “conceivable 
justification” for the statute was a “user fee.”  Id. at 270–71.  But even then, the court could not 
reconcile the lack of a reasonable relationship to the “overall cost” of the service.  Id. (noting that the 
statutorily appropriated funds were not related to the cost of funding the civil justice system, nor 
were they earmarked for a specific purpose related to the judicial process). 
 120.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1989) (repealed 1995). 
 121.  Kirk, 818 P.2d at 264. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Smith, 125 P.3d at 950. 
 124.  Id.  The Utah statute at the time read, “In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded 
and paid, 50% of the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment of 
attorneys’ fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for deposit into the General Fund.”  UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (LexisNexis 2005). 
 125. Smith, 125 P.3d at 950. 
 126.  Id. (“[B]ecause the specified [split-recovery statute] can be satisfied only when a judgment 
is paid, the statute gives the State no interest whatsoever in the underlying judgment . . . .  The 
State’s only interest, therefore, is one to the proceeds of punitive damages judgments.”).  It is 
important to note, however, that both the Utah and Colorado legislatures revised their split-recovery 
statutes to have the punitive damage award vest in both the state and the plaintiff concurrently, thus 
bringing the statutes into conformity with their courts’ judicial holdings.  See infra Appendix A. 
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Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith.127  In that case, the Supreme Court determined 
that a state could not constitutionally collect the interest accruing on money 
in court accounts because the principal-holder had a viable expectation of 
receiving the interest.128  Similarly, opponents of split-recovery statutes 
argue that plaintiffs have a reasonable expectation in punitive damage 
awards, and, thus, that when the state deprives the plaintiff of the award it 
violates the Takings Clause.129  Moreover, critics contend that, based upon 
the Court’s analysis in Beckwith, split-recovery statutes should be found 
unconstitutional under the Takings Clause because the state’s allocation of a 
plaintiff’s punitive damage award to a state or public fund serves no 
reasonable relation to the cost of using the courts.130 
 
 127.  Webb’s Fabulous Pharms., Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 162 (1980). 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Kirk v. Denver Publ’g Co., 818 P.2d 262, 269, 271–72 (Colo. 1991). 
 130.  Stevens, supra note 100, at 876.  The Supreme Court in Beckwith concluded that a state 
could not constitutionally collect the interest accruing on money in court accounts as a fee for using 
the courts because it bore no reasonable relationship to the cost of using the courts: 
To put it another way: a State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into 
public property without compensation, even for the limited duration of the deposit in 
court.  This is the very kind of thing that the Taking[s] Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
was meant to prevent.  That Clause stands as a shield against the arbitrary use of 
governmental power. 
449 U.S. at 164.  Similarly, the Court in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156, 
156 (1998), held that interest collected from Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts (IOLTA) could not 
be assigned to the state, as it was protected by the Takings Clause.  Additionally, the Supreme Court 
upheld a federal statute that required the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to deduct 1.5% from 
the first $5 million dollars of an arbitration award entered by the Iran-United State Claims Tribunal 
because it fairly represented the expenses of the United States government incurred during the 
arbitration.  United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 394–95 (1989).  Therefore, the rule to be 
gleaned from these cases is that where the government infringes upon a vested property interest, the 
appropriation, in order to be constitutional, must “bear a reasonable relationship to the governmental 
services” leading to the damage award.  Kirk, 818 P.2d at 270. 
  The Supreme Court in Beckwith, however, did acknowledge that a state might rightly deprive 
a private party of his or her property if doing so to promote general welfare.  449 U.S at 163.  
Proponents of split-recovery statutes argue that the statutes bear a reasonable relationship to a 
legitimate government purpose: to stop plaintiffs from receiving a windfall when punitive damages 
are meant to benefit society generally.  See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  By so doing, 
split-recovery statutes operate to promote the general welfare of society, and, thereby, escape 
liability under the Takings Clause.  See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
  Another issue commonly blended with and often indistinguishable from the aforementioned 
Takings Clause argument is that split-recovery statutes violate the Due Process Clause under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Evans, supra note 93, at 520–22.  Similar to the argument in Beckwith, the 
argument here is that a plaintiff is denied his or her due process when a legislative enactment has no 
reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.  Evans v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1058 
(Alaska 2002).  Moreover, under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, one has a right 
to be heard by the court prior to deprivation of property.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  “If the state is 
the direct beneficiary of a punitive damages award, broader due process concerns might be 
implicated by the very fact that the government and its officers (i.e., judges) have an arguable 
pecuniary interest in the case.”  Sharkey, supra note 74, at 438; see also Schwartz, I’ll Take That, 
supra note 25, at 550 (“Split-recovery laws provide the jury with a motive for awarding punitive 
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For example, turning to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Beckwith and 
United States v. Sperry Corp., the Kirk court determined that there was no 
acceptable justification, under the Fifth Amendment, for the taking 
perpetrated by the split-recovery statute because the statute operated “in a 
manner and to a degree unrelated to any constitutionally permissible 
governmental interest.”131  Thus, the statute was invalid.132  But this has not 
been the only challenge to split-recovery statutes. 
2.  Excessive Fines Clause 
Contemporaneous to the constitutional challenges brought under the 
Fifth Amendment, critics have suggested that split-recovery statutes violate 
the Eighth Amendment by imposing excessive fines upon plaintiffs.133  And 
although only those fines that are criminal in nature are traditionally 
considered to fall under the auspices of the Excessive Fines Clause,134 judges 
and scholars agree that punitive damages—and, by extension, split-recovery 
statutes—may implicate Eighth Amendment constraints by bridging the gap 
between civil and criminal theory through the twin aims of punishment and 
deterrence.135 
 
damages other than for punishment or deterrence.”).  While the court turns to the rational basis test 
to determine whether there is a legitimate governmental purpose for the split-recovery statute, 
Stevens, supra note 100, at 878, the fulcrum for this argument again rests upon the definition of 
property, leading back to the analysis required for a violation of the Takings Clause.  See Part 
III.A.1. 
 131.  Kirk, 818 P.2d at 264.  Furthermore, “placing the burden of payment on the judgment 
creditor who suffered the wrong bears no reasonable relationship to any arguable goal of punishing 
the wrongdoer or deterring others from engaging in similar conduct.”  Id. at 270. 
 132.  Id. at 273. 
 133.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Schwartz, I’ll Take That, supra note 25, at 554–56 (analyzing 
whether split-recovery statutes violate the Excessive Fines clause).  While the Supreme Court has 
never expressly held that the Excessive Fines Clause was meant to apply directly to the states, some 
judges and scholars have indicated that it should—in light of the fact that two other clauses in the 
Eighth Amendment have been applied to the states.  See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco 
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 284 (1989) (O’Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“I 
see no reason to distinguish one Clause of the Eighth Amendment from another for purposes of 
incorporation,” and, as such, “would hold that the Excessive Fines Clause also applies to the 
States.”); Rabe, supra note 21, at 344–46 (noting that Browning-Ferris left the door open to 
challenge split-recovery statutes). 
 134.  Stevens, supra note 100, at 878–88. 
 135.  Recent Case, supra note 101, at 1695–96; Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: 
Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 109 n.20 
(1995) (“Defendants who have been assessed punitive awards in” states that use split-recovery 
statutes “have argued that their awards are ‘excessive fines,’ claiming that the state-payee 
distinguishes these awards from private damage awards that escape Eighth Amendment review.”). 
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In the seminal case of Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. 
Kelco Disposal, Inc., the Supreme Court concluded that punitive damages do 
not inherently violate the Excessive Fines Clause; yet the Court limited its 
analysis to “a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the 
action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded.”136  The 
Court continued, “[T]he only shield that protects ordinary punitive damages 
from Eighth Amendment scrutiny appears to be a formalistic distinction 
between ‘governmental involvement and purely private suits.’”137  Thus, 
when punitive damages are diverted from the plaintiff to the state under a 
split-recovery statute, the shield is effectively removed, causing the punitive 
damage award to fall outside the purview of Browning-Ferris and function 
in a manner that could trigger an excessive fines breach.138  It is for these 
 
 136.  Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 263–64, 275 (“Here the government . . . has not taken a 
positive step to punish, as it most obviously does in the criminal context, nor has it used the civil 
courts to extract large payments or forfeitures for the purpose of raising revenue or disabling some 
individual.”). 
 137.  Recent Case, supra note 101, at 1696 (quoting Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 298 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 138.  Id.  Indeed, it is significant to note that while the Court implied that a government might 
violate the Eighth Amendment by recovering punitive damages in a civil action, the justices 
explicitly left the issue open.  See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 275 n.21.  More notable is the fact 
that Justice O’Connor cited Florida’s split-recovery statute as an example for when the Excessive 
Fines Clause may apply to punitive damages.  Id. at 298–99 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Justice Stevens commented in another seminal punitive damages case originating 
in a state with a split-recovery statute, “The fact that part of the award in this case is payable to the 
State lends further support to my conclusion that it should be treated as the functional equivalent of a 
criminal sanction.”  Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 359 n.1 (2007) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  In this Comment, it is assumed arguendo that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to 
state action resulting from a split-recovery statute. 
  One federal court did determine that Georgia’s split recovery statute was in violation of the 
Constitution’s Excessive Fines Clause.  McBride v. Gen. Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1579 
(M.D. Ga. 1990).  The district court in that case “declare[d] that there can be no legitimate purpose 
for a state to involve itself in the area of civil damage litigation between private parties wherein 
punitive damages are a legitimate item of recovery, where the State, through the legislative process, 
preempts for itself a share of the award.”  Id.  By the state receiving a portion of the punitive 
damages, the court reasoned that the state converted the civil nature of the prior Georgia punitive 
damages statute into a statute where fines are used for the benefit of the state.  Id.  Thus, the statute 
fell outside the bounds set by Browning-Ferris, and it ran contrary to the Constitution’s prohibition 
on excessive fines and double jeopardy.  Id.; see also supra note 108 and accompanying text.  The 
court was later criticized for its conclusion that any statutes which fell outside the scope of 
Browning-Ferris were a “per se ‘constitutional infirmity.’”  Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 
F.3d 985, 1006 n.23 (9th Cir. 2007).  A more thorough reading of the Supreme Court’s holding 
indicates that the Court left open the question of what would happen if the state received a portion of 
the punitive damage award.  Id. 
  The district court also reasoned that the split-recovery statute denied equal protection to 
product liability plaintiffs because it was only applicable in product liability cases; non-product 
liability plaintiffs were able to collect 100% of the punitive damage award, whereas 75% of the 
punitive damage award went to the state in a product liability case.  McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1578.  
Subsequently, the court could find no rational basis for the inequality: 
[T]he 75% award is a revenue producing measure inasmuch as it would be arbitrary to 
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reasons that constitutional challenges threaten the viability of split-recovery 
statutes without ameliorating judicial instruction. 
IV.  FEDERAL COURTS, THE NINTH CIRCUIT, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
ENGQUIST 
Although lawsuits concerning the constitutionality of split-recovery 
statutes have intermittently arisen in state courts, federal courts have 
remained largely aloof from review of split-recovery statutes, allowing the 
ambiguity surrounding their constitutionality to persist.139  To date, less than 
 
fail to assess all punitive damage awards if the purpose of assessing any award was to 
raise revenue for the State.  The Court finds that revenue is incidental, and that the 
arbitrary and unreasonable provision is business oriented, designed to restrict injured 
plaintiffs of an incentive to bring actions to punish, penalize, or deter egregious business 
practices. 
Id. 
  Three years later, however, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed any negative sentiment 
towards its split-recovery statute when it found the statute to be constitutional.  Mack Trucks, Inc. v. 
Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ga. 1993) (determining that the risk of the defendant’s actions “falls 
on society as well as on the individual plaintiff who has been harmed. . . .  [And] [a]s the risk and 
harm are distributed between the individual plaintiff and all citizens . . . the legislature has seen fit to 
distribute a portion of the damages awarded to those at potential risk—all citizens of the state”).  The 
court specifically determined that the split-recovery statute did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause because “all similarly situated plaintiffs and defendants . . . are treated equally by the 
statute.”  Id.  It also determined that there was not an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment—and thus no due process violation—because the plaintiff did not have a 
vested right in the punitive damage award.  Id.; see also infra Part IV.A.  Noticeably absent from the 
Georgia Supreme Court’s analysis, however, was any ruling as to whether the statue violated the 
Excessive Fines Clause.  Mack Trucks, Inc., 436 S.E.2d at 635.  Nevertheless, the court was not 
bound by the district court’s ruling in McBride, id. at 642 (Benham, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); thus, when it determined the statute to be constitutional, the court effectively 
mooted the ruling by the district court in McBride. 
  To this day, the statute remains effective in Georgia.  GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (West 
2011).  The only difference between the statute cited as unconstitutional in McBride and the current 
Georgia split-recovery statute is that the Georgia Tort Reform Act of 1987, section 51-12-5.1(e)(1)–
(2), indicated that the state’s punitive damage apportionment would be paid to the Fiscal Division of 
the Department of Administrative Services, whereas the current statute directs the funds to the 
Office of the State Treasurer.  Thus, there does not seem to be any major reform to the statute that 
would have made the district court in McBride alter its ruling; but this is inconsequential given the 
Georgia Supreme Court’s holding in Mack Trucks. 
 139.  See infra note 140.  While it does not take a federal court to determine the constitutionality 
of split-recovery statutes, absent review by the Supreme Court, a decision by a federal court—
particularly a circuit court—is important because there are multiple inconsistent state court rulings.  
Compare Evans v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002), and Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467 (Ind. 
2003), with Kirk v. Denver Publ’g Co., 818 P.2d 262, 267–73 (Colo. 1991), and Smith v. Price Dev. 
Co., 125 P.3d 945 (Utah 2005).  A decision by a federal circuit can provide needed guidance in the 
area of law.  See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483–84 (1981) (determining 
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a handful of federal courts have specifically analyzed the constitutionality of 
split-recovery statutes.140  Of those cases, less than half provide the type of 
substantive analysis necessary for a proper resolution of any aspect of split-
recovery statutes’ constitutional obscurity.141  And although the Supreme 
Court is aware of the legal theory, they have not taken an opportunity to 
 
that a “uniform interpretation” is advanced by the decision of a federal court); see also Jonathan 
Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges’ Interpretations of State Law, 
77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975, 997 (2004) (“A federal judge’s ‘superior appreciation of and sensitivity to 
the [state law] issues . . . and the underlying state policies bearing on [those issues]’ should be a 
source of greater reliability.” (quoting Randall P. Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and 
Allocation of Judicial Power, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1123 (1974))). 
 140.  Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2007); Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. 
Supp. 1225, 1242 (S.D. Iowa 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
the Iowa split-recovery statute was not unconstitutional because “[a] clear distinction can be made 
between funds that are to be placed into the state treasury and those funds that are to be placed into a 
civil reparations trust fund to be administered by the courts”); McBride v. Gen. Motors Corp., 737 F. 
Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).  Some federal courts have mentioned that a state’s split-recovery 
statute is constitutional, but have provided no substantive analysis as to why the underlying issue 
does not require the court to undertake such an examination.  See Patton v. Target Corp., 627 F.3d 
1304 (9th Cir. 2010) (determining that while the state had a valid interest in the punitive damage vis-
à-vis Oregon’s split-recovery statute, the state’s consent to a post-verdict settlement that destroyed 
its interest was not required); Miele v. Prudential Bache Sec., 62 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(deferring to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision regarding its split-recovery statute, which 
required that 60% of a punitive damages award be paid to the state Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Account); Finley v. Empiregas Inc. of Potosi, 28 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 1994) (determining that 
while the Missouri split-recovery statute was constitutional, because the Missouri statute merely 
stated that a portion of the punitive damages “‘shall be deemed rendered in favor of the state of 
Missouri,” the state’s interest in the punitive damage award did not automatically vest and “[t]he 
statute [did] not direct the district court to enter judgment in the underlying action in favor of the 
State or to make the award payable to the State”) (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 537.675(2) (1995)); 
Liberty Natural Prods., Inc. v. Hoffman, 03:11-CV-00264-HU, 2011 WL 4625703 (D. Or. Sept. 2, 
2011) (rejecting plaintiff’s request to allow the state to intervene and remand the case to state court 
where punitive damages were sought, reaffirming that “the State can merely be identified as a 
judgment creditor in the judgment and need not intervene as a party” (quoting Engquist, 478 F.3d at 
1001)).  Certain bankruptcy courts have also undertaken an exploration of split-recovery statutes in 
their decisions, but any analysis they include is largely lackluster.  See In re Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Portland in Or., 339 B.R. 215, 228 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006) (challenging the 
constitutionality of the payment to the state of its statutory portion of the punitive damage award 
would result in a violation of the Establishment Clause under the First Amendment; the court in this 
case gave no weight to the “difficult to understand” argument); In re Kelly, J08-00681-DMD, 2010 
WL 7507399 (Bankr. D. Alaska June 4, 2010) (mentioning that Alaska’s “punitive damages are 
capped at $500,000.00 and 50% of any punitive damage award is payable to the State of Alaska”). 
  In a few instances, a plaintiff in his or her complaint has brought up the constitutionality of a 
split-recovery statute only to have the case subsequently dismissed or disposed of on other issues.  
See, e.g., Blume v. Myers, CV-99-1423-HU, 2000 WL 210605 (D. Or. Feb. 22, 2000) (granting the 
motion to dismiss and declining to determine the constitutionality of the statute).  Thus, the question 
of the statute’s constitutionality remains unanswered.  Other times, a federal court may make some 
comment in dicta about a state’s split recovery statute, but does not initiate an inquisition into its 
constitutionality.  See Chadima v. Nat’l Fid. Life Ins. Co., 894 F. Supp. 1300, 1301 n.4 (S.D. Iowa 
1995) (“[I]t is interesting to note that Iowa is one of only eight states to have passed legislation 
requiring payment of some portion of punitive damages to the state or state-sponsored funds.”). 
 141.  See supra note 140. 
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specifically address the constitutionality of this legislative tool.142  Thus, 
when the Ninth Circuit undertook a review of Oregon’s split-recovery 
statute in Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, its de novo 
analysis was the first real federal attempt at solving this constitutional 
conundrum.143 
In an opinion written by Judge Tashima, the Ninth Circuit examined 
whether Oregon’s split-recovery statute, which allocated 60% of the 
plaintiff’s $175,000 punitive damage award to Oregon’s Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Account, violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause 
and the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.144  Moreover, the 
Engquist court attempted to answer whether the split-recovery statute gave a 
non-party an interest in the judgment or implicated judicial estoppel 
concerns.145 
A.  Takings Clause 
To determine whether Oregon’s split-recovery statute operated as an 
unlawful taking, the Ninth Circuit first had to determine if the punitive 
damage award could be defined as property under the Fifth Amendment.146  
If the punitive damages could be defined as property, any subsequent taking 
 
 142.  In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 613–14, 616–18 (1996), Justice 
Ginsburg attached an appendix to her dissent that specifically identified split-recovery statutes as a 
valid control on punitive damages.  The split-recovery statutes are listed under the heading 
“Allocation of Punitive Damages to State Agencies.”  Id. at 616.  Furthermore, the Court in Cooper 
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 429 (2001), recognized that the 
Oregon split-recovery statute took 60% of the plaintiff’s punitive damage award, but declined to 
comment on the issue.  Another opportunity for the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of 
split-recovery statutes came in the 2007 case of Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).  
In what has become a key case for reviewing the constitutionality of punitive damages generally, the 
Supreme Court limited its review to only two questions: (1) whether Oregon had unconstitutionally 
permitted the defendant to be punished for harming nonparty victims; and (2) whether Oregon had 
disregarded “the constitutional requirement that punitive damages be reasonably related to the 
plaintiff’s harm.”  Id. at 352.  And while the court could have included an analysis of Oregon’s split-
recovery statute under the second question, it did not.  Id. at 357–58.  As recently as 2009, the 
United States Supreme Court has had an opportunity to specifically answer the question of whether 
the Alaska split-recovery statute—which allowed the State to collect 50% of any award of punitive 
damages—violated the Takings Clause or the Due Process Clause, but the Court declined to grant 
certiorari to resolve the issue.  Reust v. Alaska Petroleum Contractors, Inc., 206 P.3d 437 (Alaska 
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 461 (2009). 
 143.  Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 144.  Id. at 1000. 
 145.  Id. at 1000–01. 
 146.  Id. at 1002; see supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text (reviewing the definition of 
property in a judicial context). 
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by the State’s split-recovery statute would violate the Constitution.147  
Whether punitive damage awards qualified as property under the Takings 
Clause was “a question of first impression in the federal courts.”148 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by turning to Webb’s Fabulous 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith and Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 
both cases wherein the Supreme Court concluded that a property interest had 
existed and said that the interest had been invaded by the state through 
legislative action in violation of the Fifth Amendment.149  Although these 
cases lacked a general rule for how to define property under the Takings 
Clause, the Engquist court highlighted the Supreme Court’s reliance on the 
“certainty of the principal-holder’s expectation of receiving” the property to 
determine if a protectable interest existed.150 
When measured under this certainty standard, the Engquist court could 
not find a cognitive justification for defining punitive damages as 
property.151  Punitive damages only exist when a jury bestows them upon the 
plaintiff.152  Similarly, even if the jury finds that the defendant acted 
maliciously or recklessly, there is nothing that requires a jury to award 
punitive damages.153  Due to these volatile and speculative circumstances, 
the court determined that punitive damages lacked the essential feature 
requisite for Takings Clause protection—certainty.154  Furthermore, the 
Engquist court found any attempt to analogize punitive damage awards to an 
incidental ownership property right like those at issue in Beckwith and 
Phillips equally unavailing: “Simply put, punitive damages do not follow 
compensatory damages, as interest follows principal.”155  Thus, because 
 
 147.  Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1002. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id.  The Engquist court was quick to recognize a property owner’s fundamental ability to 
dispose of all or part of a property interest as he or she sees fit.  Id.  The court also noted that the 
Supreme Court in Beckwith focused on “incidents of ownership,” with the Supreme Court holding 
that incidental rights of ownership carry with them the same protection under the Fifth Amendment 
as the property to which they belong.  Id. at 1002–03. 
 150.  Id. at 1003.  The most critical question as to “whether these intangible rights are 
constitutionally protected from a government taking is the nature of the ‘reasonable investment-
backed expectations’ of the party seeking protection.”  Anderson v. State ex rel. Cent. Bering Sea 
Fishermen’s Ass’n, 78 P.3d 710, 715 (Alaska 2003) (Matthews, J., dissenting) (quoting Ruckelshaus 
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1006–07 (1984)).  As described by the Alaska Supreme Court, 
“[R]easonable expectations are critical both in determining whether a claim is property and whether 
government interference with it is a taking.”  Id. 
 151.  Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1003–04. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id.  Only when the jury awards punitive damages and the damage properly vests in the 
plaintiff are exemplary damages transformed from their ephemeral state to a state of permanency.  
Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. at 1003; see supra notes 114–15 (discussing how the Supreme Court has determined that 
once a judgment is vested in the plaintiff, it becomes the property of the plaintiff, carrying with it the 
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punitive damage awards “are necessarily contingent and discretionary,” the 
plaintiff did not and could not have a reasonable expectation in the award.156  
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit could not define punitive damages as property 
under the Fifth Amendment, and, as a result, the split-recovery statute did 
not operate as an unlawful taking.157 
The Engquist court further supported its position by reaffirming the non-
compensatory nature of punitive damages.158  Because punitive damages are 
meant to punish and deter, the court resolved that any supplemental profit 
 
constitutional protections of the Fifth Amendment).  Property rights are a creation of state law.  
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32 (1978) (“Our cases have 
clearly established that a person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law.  
The Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized 
by the common law, to attain a permissible legislative object, despite the fact that otherwise settled 
expectations may be upset thereby.”) (internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted); Bd. of 
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).  As such, a state legislature “may abate 
actions pending,” Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 268 (Colo. 1991) (emphasis added), 
by creating a statute that “prospectively limit[s] the availability of punitive damage[] awards.”  
Smith v. Price Dev. Co., 125 P.3d 945, 953 (Utah 2005); see Stevens, supra note 100, at 874 
(“[U]nlike the right to compensatory damages guaranteed by common law or state constitutions, the 
allowance of punitive damages is subject to the discretion of state legislatures,” the same power 
which gives states the authority to condition or completely abolish punitive damages.); see also 
Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ga. 1993) (“A plaintiff has no vested property 
right in the amount of punitive damages which can be awarded in any case, and the legislature may 
lawfully regulate the amount of punitive damages which can be awarded.”).  Specifically, “[t]he 
legislature cannot modify a judgment which is a property right, but the legislature is free to condition 
a claim for exemplary damages which is allowed only pursuant to a statutory grant.”  Kirk, 818 P.2d 
at 274–75.  Viewed in that light, a state legislature cannot pass a law that deprives a citizen of a 
vested right only if the citizen has more than a mere anticipated expectation in the right; the citizen 
must have legal or equitable title to the property.  Id.  Nonetheless, unlike real or personal 
property—which belongs to the plaintiff prior to litigation—”[b]ecause of the inherently uncertain 
nature of punitive damages, which are a ‘discretionary moral judgment’ by the jury . . . a plaintiff’s 
interest in receipt of any certain amount of punitive damages is too speculative to constitute property 
under the Takings Clause.”  Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1003 (quoting Larez v. City of L.A., 946 F.2d 
630, 648 (9th Cir. 1991)); DeMendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232, 1246 (Or. 2002) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court held that interest earned on principal was ‘private property’ subject to a takings claim only 
because it was a ‘traditional property interest[] long recognized under state law’. . . .  [T]here is no 
‘long-recognized’ private property interest in a . . . punitive damage[] award before judgment; it has 
always been, at most, an expectation.”). 
 156.  Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1002, 1004; see DeMendoza, 51 P.3d at 1246 (“‘A vested right must 
be something more than a mere expectation based upon the anticipated continuance of existing laws; 
it must have become a title legal or equitable to the present or future enjoyment of property.’”) 
(quoting Coshun v. Hurlburt, 201 P. 870, 871 (Or. 1921)); Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice 
Petrides-Donohue & Assoc., 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991) (considering the discretionary nature of 
punitive damages and because they are not awarded to a successful claimant as a matter of right, the 
plaintiff did not have a constitutionally protected interest in the punitive damage award). 
 157.  Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1004. 
 158.  Id. 
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derived from the punitive damage award by the plaintiff resulted from the 
award having no other beneficiary, and, therefore, the benefit was 
inconsequential to a Takings Clause analysis.159  In like manner, the 
Engquist court reasoned, given the broad discretion granted to the states by 
the Supreme Court in fashioning “their punitive damages schemes,” the 
allocation of a punitive damage award between the plaintiff and the state vis-
a-vis a split-recovery statute did not raise Takings Clause concern.160  As a 
result, the split-recovery statute stood up to Fifth Amendment review.  Next, 
the court had to see if the split-recovery statute could withstand critical 
analysis under the Eighth Amendment. 
 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. (reviewing the Court’s general analysis of punitive damages in BMW of North America, 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)); see also supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text 
(commenting on the broad discretion given by the Supreme Court to states regarding the regulation 
of punitive damages).  The court in Engquist also looked at several state court decisions where the 
state supreme “courts concluded that a plaintiff has no vested right in punitive damages, either (1) 
because the damages are discretionary and non-compensatory, or (2) because the statutes operate to 
limit the awards before the time of judgment.”  Id. at 1004–05.  As part of that analysis, the court 
looked at the decisions by the supreme courts of Colorado and Utah, but merely concluded that its 
“holding that punitive damages are not cognizable as property under the Takings Clause” is 
consistent with the majority of state supreme courts who have decided the issue.  Id. at 1005.  The 
court did not, however, undertake an exploration of the decisions in Kirk and Smith.  Id.; see supra 
notes 116–26 and accompanying text (explaining the facts and holding for both cases).  Yet, in light 
of the court’s holding in Engquist, it is unclear whether the Ninth Circuit would have reached the 
same decision if the Oregon split-recovery statute did not give any interest to the state until after the 
punitive damage award vested in the plaintiff.  See Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1005.  Given the Engquist 
court’s conclusion that punitive damages cannot be defined as property under the Fifth Amendment 
given their uncertainty, it seems the court would have reached the same result, even under the 
circumstances described in Kirk and Smith.  Id.  However, that would lead to the conclusion that no 
matter the circumstances surrounding a split-recovery statute, there is no argument that the statute 
violates the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause because the punitive damage award is so 
speculative.  Id. 
  On the other hand, the Smith court determined that the uncertainty associated with punitive 
damages could be removed once the award vested in the plaintiff and prior to the state’s intercession 
upon it for public use.  125 P.3d at 949.  By so doing, the plaintiff is provided with a reasonable and 
protectable property interest in the punitive damage award, thereby precluding the state from any 
interference with the award.  Id.  It seems logical that if the state has not attempted to allocate the 
punitive damage award between itself and the plaintiff prior to plaintiff realizing the award, the state 
losses its opportunity to intervene because the award becomes plaintiff’s property.  See supra notes 
113–14 and accompanying text (defining property within this context).  Therefore, when the Ninth 
Circuit says its Engquist opinion is in accordance with a majority of the states that have decided the 
issue, it is probable the court excluded Kirk and Smith because Oregon’s split-recovery statute did 
not wait until after the award had vested in the plaintiff to become effective.  See Engquist, 478 F.3d 
at 1005. 
  Proceeding to the argument that split-recovery statutes violate the Due Process Clause under 
the Fifth Amendment, the gravamen of this issue once again turns on whether a punitive damage 
award is property unlawfully taken by the government.  See supra note 130 and accompanying text.  
Adopting the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Engquist quickly resolves the question.  Once again, 
punitive damages cannot be considered property given their uncertainty, and, therefore, any 
contention that split-recovery statutes deprive plaintiffs of property prior to a judicial hearing 
similarly fails.  See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
07 SANDERS SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/13  3:23 PM 
[Vol. 40: 785, 2013] Uncle Sam and the Partitioning Punitive Problem 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
819 
B.  Excessive Fines Clause 
In a question of first impression for the Courts of Appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit attempted to resolve the question left open by the Supreme Court in 
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.: is the 
Excessive Fines Clause violated when the state receives a portion of the 
punitive damage award under a split-recovery statute?161  Specifically, the 
court sought to determine whether the State having a right to share in the 
punitive damage award violated the Eighth Amendment.162  Once again, the 
Engquist court turned to judicial precedent.163 
In United States v. Bajakajian,164 the Supreme Court remarked that at 
the time the Constitution was adopted, the word “fine” was understood to 
mean “a payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense.”165  Thus, 
to elicit Eighth Amendment protection, a government-induced monetary 
extraction would need to function “as punishment for some offense.”166  
With regard to Oregon’s split-recovery statute, however, the Ninth Circuit 
found that, because the “operation” of the statute was unrelated to the 
plaintiff’s culpability, no punishment of the plaintiff occurred.167  
 
 161.  See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text.  It is also important to note that the 
Supreme Court declined to address the issue in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 
Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 429 (2001), even though the Court was aware that Oregon had a split-recovery 
clause that allocated 60% of the punitive damage award to the state.  See supra notes 140, 142 and 
accompanying text.  Once again, the Supreme Court has never explicitly stated that the Eighth 
Amendment applies to the states, see supra notes 134–35, but the Engquist court’s analysis is 
important regarding the ramifications of a federal split-recovery statute or similar regulatory tool.  
See infra Part V. 
 162.  Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1006. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).  “Bajakajian ultimately concluded 
that the statutory provision at issue in that case—which required certain felons to forfeit their 
currency at sentencing—did implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because it was intended to 
punish.”  Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1006. 
 165.  Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 327–28. 
 166.  Id. at 328. 
 167.  See Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1007.  The court in Engquist also analogized its situation 
involving the Excessive Fines Clause to another case in which taxpayers objected to a retroactive tax 
on their Roth IRA.  Id. at 1006 (citing Kitt v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 821, 827 (2000)).  In that 
case, the court decided that the tax was unrelated to the taxpayers’ culpability, as well as not being 
imposed as punishment for any purpose within the ambit of the Excessive Fines Clause.  Id.  
Similarly, the split-recovery statute in Engquist did not look to the plaintiff’s culpability to 
determine if it would come into effect and could not be considered a punishment of the plaintiff.  Id. 
at 1006–07.  In Hosking v. Business Men’s Assurance, 79 S.W.3d 901, 904 (Mo. 2002), the Missouri 
Supreme Court concluded that Missouri’s split-recovery statute did not violate the Excessive Fines 
Clause because the statute “did not implicate the state’s prosecutorial power or provide the state with 
any interest in the punitive damages award prior to a final judgment . . . .”  Schwartz, I’ll Take That, 
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Accordingly, the court determined that the split-recovery statute did not 
violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.168 
C.  Supplementary Issues Decided By the Engquist Court 
Also at issue in Engquist was whether the split-recovery statute, which 
awarded 60% of plaintiff’s punitive damage award to Oregon when the State 
was not a plaintiff in the action, operated as a judgment in favor of a non-
party.169  Traditionally, a person who is not a party to an action cannot be a 
party to the judgment of that action.170  Yet, the split-recovery statute 
allowed the State to “assert its ‘substantive right as a judgment creditor.’”171  
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), a judgment creditor is 
permitted to intervene in a lawsuit to the extent necessary to secure its 
interest.172  Consequently, the split-recovery statute entitled the state to assert 
the same substantive rights upon the punitive damage award as those 
associated with a judgment creditor, and, therefore, the court determined that 
there was not a judgment in favor of a non-party.173  Indeed, as a statutory 
judgment creditor, the State was capable of intervening with a punitive 
damage to secure its interest.174 
The final question the Engquist court addressed with regard to the split-
recovery statute was the potential for a judicial estoppel violation.175  
“Judicial estoppel prevents a party from taking inconsistent positions when 
those inconsistencies have an adverse effect on the judicial process.”176  This 
is only at issue within the context of split-recovery statutes where—as in 
Engquist—the state is a named defendant in the action, denies liability for 
punitive damages, and subsequently seeks a portion of the punitive damage 
 
supra note 25, at 555 (reviewing the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in that case).  
 168.  Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1007. 
 169.  Id. at 1001. 
 170.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942). 
 171.  Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1001 (citing OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.735(1) (West 2011) (Oregon’s 
split-recovery statute)). 
 172.  Id. at 1001.  A judgment creditor is “[a] person having a legal right to enforce execution of a 
judgment for a specific sum of money.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 921 (9th ed. 2009). 
 173.  Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1001.  Some commentators have observed, “[C]ompensation for 
harms to individuals other than the plaintiff before the court, or to ‘society’ more generally, would 
seem to fall outside the confines of the doctrine of punitive damages . . . .”  Sharkey, supra note 74, 
at 350.  However, in the case of split-recovery statutes, once the jury awards punitive damages, the 
state is automatically entitled to its statutory portion of the punitive damages award as a judgment 
creditor.  DeMendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232, 1247 (Or. 2002) (A split-recovery statute “asserts 
that the state has an interest immediately ‘upon entry of a verdict.’”). 
 174.  Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1001. 
 175.  Id. at 1000. 
 176.  Id. 
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award.177  While it was true that the state could not take contradictory 
positions adverse to the litigation process, the court determined that it was 
not the defendant’s view that changed when the punitive damage award was 
apportioned to the state, but the state’s position.178  Moreover, it was the jury 
that determined the defendant in Engquist had acted so inappropriately as to 
merit punitive damages, not the State.179  And because, as indicated above, 
the state was a judgment creditor, the Ninth Circuit held that the state was 
automatically entitled to its portion of the punitive damage award.180 
Alas, Engquist did not result in answers to the Fifth and Eighth 
Amendment questions that have plagued split-recovery statutes since their 
inception, nor did it provide resolution or clarity as to additional issues.  It 
would seem, then, that split-recovery statutes may now become the gold 
standard in punitive damage regulation—but this may not necessarily be the 
case.  There are still residual issues surrounding split-recovery statutes that 
have been left unresolved by the courts and the legislature. 
V.  LINGERING PROBLEMS AND A PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL ACTION 
A.  Why Federal Action is Needed: Erie and the State v. Federal Law 
Problem 
While a number of states have undertaken legislative attempts to reform 
and regulate punitive damages—including the use of split-recovery 
statutes—regulation at the federal level is minimal.181  Admittedly, some 
federal statutes have expressly prohibited the recovery of punitive 
damages.182  Yet, the bulk of federal punitive damage jurisprudence is 
 
 177.  See id.  In this case, the Oregon Justice Department, as Defendant’s counsel, had vehemently 
denied liability for any damages caused by the Oregon Department of Agriculture.  Id.  Yet, as soon 
as the jury found for the plaintiff and punitive damages were awarded, Oregon sought a portion of 
those damages.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Although judicial review is constitutionally mandated, “[b]ecause of the difficulty of 
probing juror reasoning,” judges generally only review punitive damage awards when there is 
“passion, prejudice, or partiality from the size of the award.”  Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 
415, 425 (1994).  Therefore, many cases involving punitive damages escape regulation through 
judicial review.  See id. 
 182.  Examples include: the Communications Act of 1934; the Federal Tort Claims Act; the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA); the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act; the Interstate Commerce Act; the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure 
Act; the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; and the Securities Acts.  SCHLUETER, 
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contained in three Supreme Court cases. 
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court explicated its three 
famous guideposts, which require courts to examine: (1) the reprehensibility 
of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual damages or 
harm incurred by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the 
difference between the punitive damages and civil penalties imposed in 
comparable cases to determine whether the punitive damage award is 
constitutional.183  A few years later, in State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Court determined that a proper punitive 
damage award should rarely exceed a single-digit ratio between it and the 
compensatory damage award.184  Most recently, in Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams, the Court held that a jury might only consider the harm done to the 
plaintiff when calculating the punitive damage award.185 
Without a doubt, these judicial guidelines have had a positive effect in 
controlling grossly excessive punitive damage awards.186  Moreover, they 
provide general parameters for all courts to follow.  Nonetheless, they fall 
short of consistently curing plaintiffs’ windfalls or refocusing the award to 
benefit society in general.187  Perhaps that is why states have stepped in to 
create their own punitive damage controls.188  Even still, a major problem 
arises for states that have attempted to enforce a punitive regulatory 
measure—like a split-recovery statute—when a case goes to federal court 
and the court applies the Erie doctrine.189 
 
supra note 63 § 21.2. 
 183.  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
 184.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
 185.  Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007). 
 186.  See Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. REV. 83, 105–
24, 158–59 (2007) (reviewing the propriety of numerous post-guidepost decisions). 
 187.  See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text.  While the aforementioned Supreme Court 
cases coincide chronologically with reformists’ calls for punitive damage regulation, the Court as a 
body has demonstrated particular ambivalence to plaintiffs’ receiving windfalls or making sure that 
punitive damages serve their originally intended purpose as a societal benefit.  See supra notes 39–
74.  Even so, one wonders why the Court has not taken more affirmative steps towards the issue.  
The same can be said for Congress. 
 188.  See supra notes 78–91 and accompanying text. 
 189.  For federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction, the rule articulated in Erie Railroad Co. 
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), requires application of state rules of decision to all nonfederal 
matters.  In the words of Chief Justice Warren: 
The Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization that it would be unfair for the character or 
result of a litigation materially to differ because the suit had been brought in a federal 
court. . . .  The decision was also in part a reaction to the practice of “forum-shopping.” 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965).  For federal claims, a federal court will apply federal 
law.  Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.  Consequently, issues for punitive damage regulation arise for federal 
claims in federal court, even when the state has attempted to enact regulatory measures.  See infra 
notes 190–92 and accompanying text.  There is no challenge to a state exerting its power to allocate 
the punitive damage award under a split-recovery statute on state law claims in federal court: 
[Where the l]egislature intended that the split-recovery statute allocating 60 percent of 
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Consider the following: a case is filed in federal court—either originally 
or via removal—including both state and federal law claims.190  Furthermore, 
the state where the federal court sits employs a split-recovery statute.  Under 
these circumstances—and in accordance with the Erie doctrine—the split-
recovery statute is only effective as to any punitive damages awarded on the 
state law claim.  As a result, most punitive damages awarded on a federal 
law claim escape regulation due to minimal monitoring by the federal courts, 
thereby frustrating the intentions of the states.191  Observing the numerous 
 
each punitive damages award in Oregon to the state’s Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Account would apply in federal cases arising under state law, even if the federal courts, 
because of the Supremacy Clause, would not be subject to the statute’s procedural 
requirement that the court identify the state as a judgment creditor; the 60 percent 
recovery was a substantive right, and the state had other procedural methods for 
enforcing that right, even if was not named as judgment creditor. 
Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes Requiring that 
Percentage of Punitive Damages Awards be Paid Directly to State or Court–Administered Fund, 16 
A.L.R.5th 129 (1993); Benjamin Grossberg, Uniformity, Federalism, and Tort Reform: The Erie 
Implications of Medical Malpractice Certificate of Merit Statutes, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 269 
(2010) (“And if states attempt to use that power to accomplish substantive ends, there is no reason 
that the Erie doctrine should make all of those efforts per se unenforceable in federal court merely 
because the state laws can be characterized as conflicting with one of the Federal Rules.”).   
 190.  A perfect example of this is Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 478 F.3d 985, 
999–1000 (9th 2007).  See supra notes 139–45 (reviewing the factual background of the case).  In 
that case, punitive damages were awarded for two causes of action: $125,000 on an equal protection 
claim and $125,000 on a contractual interference claim.  Engquist,  478 F.3d at 992.  In the court’s 
analysis, however, it commented that pursuant to Erie, Oregon’s split-recovery statute—which 
allocated 60% of the award to the state—only applied to the contractual interference claim.  Id. at 
1000.  Subsequently, a “State Account” was credited $75,000 representing the state’s apportioned 
punitive damage amount, but $125,000 awarded as punitive damages on the federal equal protection 
claim escaped regulation.  Id. at 992.  So, while the Ninth Circuit provided unprecedented answers to 
the two-horned constitutional dilemma—split-recovery statutes do not violate the Takings or 
Excessive Fines Clauses—the Engquist court failed to provide a resolution for the Erie issue 
described in the example.  Id. 
 191.  Even in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996), the Supreme Court 
made clear that its analysis into the excessiveness of a punitive damage award “appropriately begins 
with an identification of the state interests that a punitive award is designed to serve.”  This is not a 
new problem.  State courts and state legislatures have consistently contemplated how to make sure 
that their own regulations on punitive damages are enforced in federal court.  When faced with the 
Erie situation for a federal gender discrimination action, the Eight Circuit concluded: 
Our decision leaves open the question of how the State should enforce its alleged interest 
in federal punitive damages awards. . . .  The statute places the burden on the attorney 
general to “collect upon such judgment,” perhaps in a later action against one of the 
parties.  In such action the court could, of course, consider that a portion of the punitive 
damages award is “deemed” to be the property of the State under Missouri law.  In the 
present action, however, the State has no interest in the judgment upon which to execute. 
Finley v. Empiregas Inc. of Potosi, 28 F.3d 782, 785–86 (8th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).  
Therefore, because the split-recovery statute carried no force upon the federal gender discrimination 
action, there was nothing the federal court could do to ensure the punitive damage award in a manner 
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federal laws that allow punitive damages to be awarded in civil cases,192 this 
is problematic. 
One solution is for Congress to pass legislation—like that found in the 
National Endowment for the Oceans—meant to strictly scrutinize all 
punitive damage awards, prevent plaintiffs’ windfalls, and concentrate on 
fully using punitive damages for societal benefit.193  As established in Part 
 
prescribed by the state.  Id.  This is justifiable in that the federal courts have their own interest of 
uniformity to pursue: “To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function 
whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the 
Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress’ attempt to exercise that power in 
the Enabling Act.”  Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473–74.  However, what it does not excuse is the lack of 
punitive damage regulation in the aforementioned scenario. 
 192.  One of the largest areas, as far as the number of cases brought to federal court combined 
with punitive damages awarded on those cases, is for violations of the Federal Civil Rights Acts 
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1988 (2006).  Punitive Damages in Actions for Violations 
of Federal Civil Rights Acts, 14 A.L.R. FED. 608 (1973) (listing cases in which punitive damages 
were awarded for violations under a Federal Civil Rights Act).  Many of these arise under the banner 
of § 1983, where the defendant’s conduct exhibits “reckless or callous indifference to the federally 
protected rights of others.”  Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).  Punitive damages are statutorily 
permissible in a number of other situations.  See infra Appendix B; see also HAMMESFAHR, supra 
note 42 § 1:13 (examining the main areas of federal law that allow for punitive damages).  Punitive 
damages have also been awarded for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2011), the Freedom of Access to 
Clinic Entrances Act.  SCHLUETER, supra note 63 § 21.1(X). 
  Treble damages—exemplary damages defined as three times the amount of compensatory 
damages—may also be awarded on a number of federal law claims.  The most important of these 
statutes is the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006), which permits recovery of treble damages in 
successful anti-trust claims.  The reason the statute draws so much attention is that treble damages 
are mandatory under the Clayton Act, do not require the plaintiff to prove malice, and are generally 
large.  HAMMESFAHR, supra note 42 § 1:13; see also Neil Hamilton & Virginia B. Cone, Mitigation 
of Antitrust Damages, 66 OR. L. REV. 339, 349–56 (1987) (giving concern to the rising number of 
treble damages awarded in anti-trust claims and its effect on the economy).  Treble damages are also 
available in a number of other circumstances.  7 U.S.C. § 2321 (2011) (improper use of plant 
patents); 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2011) (recovery of treble damages for RICO case in civil courts); see 
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2011) (patent infringement); Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1301 (7th 
Cir. 1987).  Additionally, treble damages have been imposed under the False Claims Act.  See 
United States v. Karron, 750 F. Supp. 2d 480, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  Though such damages seem to 
be inherently regulated, they still allow plaintiffs to receive a windfall and have been considered 
punitive damages for all practical purposes.  See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 616 (2012) (examining 
punitive treble damages’ effect on plaintiff awards).  Additionally, there are a number of federal 
statutes that neither expressly provide for nor exclude punitive damages: Copyright Infringement; 
damages awarded under the Labor Relations Acts; Alien Tort Claims Act; Consumer Product Safety 
Act; Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA); Federal Employers’ Liability Act 
(FELA); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA); Magnuson-Moss Warranty 
Act; National Health Service Corps Scholarship Program; Oil Pollution Act of 1990; Privacy Act; 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures; and the United States Housing Act of 1937.  SCHLUETER, supra 
note 63 § 21.3. 
 193.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  This action, however, necessarily implicates an 
inverse retort—the enforcement of a federal split-recovery statute in states that do not have one—so 
there is again an imbalance in regulation.  True, federal courts are no stranger to conflicting federal 
and state laws; by using the test established in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463–64 (1965), the 
federal courts could enforce a split-recovery statute if it is deemed constitutional—which it seems to 
be—and falls within § 2072 of the Rules Enabling Act.  Under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 
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II.A, split-recovery statutes are likely the best of the current modern reform 
measures at preventing plaintiffs’ windfalls and allocating the money to the 
public generally—while, at the same time, encouraging plaintiffs to bring 
claims, paying for additional litigation expenses, and maintaining the 
primary purposes of punitive damages: punishment and deterrence.  
Additionally, split-recovery statutes are likely constitutional.194  But before 
sending Mr. Smith to Washington, split-recovery statutes have a lingering 
problem, unresolved by the courts, which must be addressed. 
B.  The Problem: Voluntary Settlement by the Parties and Its Effect on Split-
Recovery Statutes 
One of the unanticipated side effects of split-recovery statutes has been 
that they encourage adverse parties to settle: the plaintiff wants to settle to 
escape the apportionment of his or her punitive damage award by the state 
and the defendant wants to settle to avoid a large punitive damage 
judgment.195  Some scholars place a positive spin on this settlement effect, 
claiming that it gets at the central purpose of the tort system—compensating 
the plaintiffs for their injuries—while limiting litigation time and expense, as 
well as conserving judicial resources.196  However, such a theory becomes 
perverted once an impaneled jury imposes a punitive judgment on the 
defendant and the parties subsequently attempt to settle.197 
 
2072(a), the Supreme Court has the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure in 
United States district courts and courts of appeal.  Moreover, a uniform federal rule may be required 
when divergent state regulation conflicts with federal interests.  See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 496 (9th ed. 2005) (discussing how the Federal Rules were a response to “an 
extended period of agitation for uniform procedural rules”); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY 
KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 429, 432 (6th ed. 2002) (noting that the Federal Rules were 
created to address “erratic conformity to state procedure” by creating a system of uniform 
procedure).  However, such rules are “few and restricted” and limited to situations where there is a 
“significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law.”  Wallis v. Pan 
Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966). 
 194.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 195.  See Sharkey, supra note 74, at 444–45.  Split-recovery statutes may have a similar effect on 
arbitration.  Id.  The Florida Supreme Court has been one of the few courts to address this issue, 
concluding that the State’s split-recovery statute had no effect upon an arbitration agreement and that 
the parties did not need the consent of the state to arbitrate.  Miele v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 
656 So. 2d 470, 473 (Fla. 1995). 
 196.  Dodson, supra note 35, at 1351.  “Regardless of whether collusive settlements are a real 
concern with existing split-recovery schemes, however, the problem of the incentive for the plaintiff 
and defendant to settle in order to cut out the state’s portion” is of paramount concern.  Sharkey, 
supra note 74, at 445. 
 197.  Under these circumstances, the court has already had to expend time and resources on 
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Such was the issue at hand in Patton v. Target Corp.198  In that case, the 
parties sought to settle at the post-verdict stage, thus eliminating the state’s 
share of the punitive damage award under Oregon’s split-recovery statute.199  
The state attempted to intervene in the settlement by claiming that it was a 
judgment creditor, and, as such, had a protectable interest in the award.200  
After certification by the Ninth Circuit,201 the Supreme Court of Oregon 
reviewed the facts and determined that the interested parties did not need the 
state’s consent to settle the claim despite the state being classified as a 
judgment creditor.202  The court’s conclusion resulted from the lack of a 
definitive description for the rights of a judgment creditor in the text of the 
split-recovery statute; as presently worded there was nothing in the statute 
requiring the state’s consent to the settlement.203  Therefore, the parties were 
 
hearing the case, reviewing the court documents, and running the trial; the jurors have already taken 
time away from their lives to hear the case; and the parties to the litigation have spent a lot of time 
and money taking the case all the way through trial. 
 198.  Patton v. Target Corp., 242 P.3d 611 (Or. 2010), aff’d, 627 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir. 2010).  The 
case involved a wrongful discharge wherein the jury awarded the ex-employee plaintiff $85,000 in 
compensatory damages and $900,000 in punitive damages.  Id. at 613. 
 199.  Id. at 613.  Such an ex post facto decision fails to eliminate time and expense from litigation, 
as well as to preserve judicial resources: the court already did the legwork. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  The Ninth Circuit certified the following question for the Supreme Court of Oregon to 
answer: “When a jury has returned a verdict that includes an award of punitive damages . . . is the 
[s]tate[‘s] . . . consent necessary before a court may enter a judgment giving effect to any settlement 
between the parties that would result in a reduction or elimination of the punitive damages to which 
the [s]tate would otherwise be entitled . . . ?”  Patton v. Target Corp., 580 F.3d 942, 948–49 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
 202.  Patton, 242 P.3d at 619.  The Patton court looked to the legislative history for any guidance 
in what the Oregon legislature intended by using the term “judgment creditor.”  Id. at 615.  But the 
court could not find any reason to extend the definition of judgment creditor beyond the common 
and usual meaning, including the requirement of a final decision of the court.  Id. (citing BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 841–42 (6th ed. 1990)). 
 203.  Patton, 242 P.3d at 616–17, 619.  There are numerous problems with requiring a state’s 
consent to a settlement to make sure that the state does not get cut out.  Rachel D. Trickett, 
Comment, Punitive Damages: The Controversy Continues, 89 OR. L. REV. 1475, 1497 (2011) 
(“First, requiring the State’s consent before two parties may settle a claim might block worthy 
settlements that would otherwise end litigation and allow plaintiffs to obtain needed compensation 
without delay.  Second, if parties must obtain the state’s consent prior to settlement, many attorneys 
may be reluctant to pursue claims for punitive damages at the risk of not being able to control the 
claim or minimize the potential risk of taxation, allocation, and appeal on behalf of their clients.  
Third, the inability to settle a claim without the state’s consent could render the recovery of punitive 
damages meaningless to plaintiffs and attorneys as a result of tax consequences.”).  Consequently, it 
seems ill-advised to construct a split-recovery statute that would give the state an interest in the 
punitive damage award before the award was ever awarded.  The only solutions to the situation seem 
to be: (a) allow the state to intervene in a settlement where the settlement is done in bad faith—
meaning that the only reason the parties are settling is to avoid apportionment by the state—
however, such a theory requires the judge to read the minds of the parties, and the theory could 
easily be overcome by the parties devising an alternative motivation for their settlement; or (b) have 
the judge review all post-verdict settlement awards to find any money dispersed in excess of 
litigation costs and allocate that to the state.  See infra notes 216–17 and accompanying text. 
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free to settle the case at any stage in the litigation—even when a judgment 
had been entered and the very purpose of the split-recovery statute 
frustrated.204 
Patton makes clear that in order to stop a split-recovery statute from 
being rendered obsolete by post-verdict settlement, a statute must explicitly 
indicate that the government has an interest in the award once delivered by 
the jury.205  For this reason, most hypothetical split-recovery statutes include 
a timing provision that gives the state or governmental fund an interest in 
any post-verdict settlement.206  Although such a provision complicates any 
settlement between the parties, it does not allow them to evade regulation 
under the split-recovery statute.207  Additionally, because the timing 
provision does not give the state a pre-verdict interest in the settlement, it 
seeks to eliminate any concerns about giving the state an interest in a 
settlement.208  Crafting a brand new and unproven statute may not be the best 
solution to the punitive damage problem. 
C.  An Alternative Solution: A Federal Punitive Monitory Tax 
Although split-recovery statutes have been declared constitutional, 
considering the settlement problem coupled with the other harsh criticisms 
to which the statutes have been exposed,209 it is advantageous for the Federal 
Government to determine if there is a similarly useful tool it could use to 
regulate punitive damage awards—something that deals punishment and 
deterrence to defendants regardless of the compensatory damage amount, 
while stopping plaintiffs from receiving windfalls.  A simple (yet 
overlooked) solution is a federal tax on federal punitive damage awards. 
 
 204.  Patton, 242 P.3d at 619.  Moreover, it seems the Oregon legislature contemplated a 
settlement between the parties to defeat the split-recovery statute—thereby providing a windfall to 
the plaintiffs—however, “there is an unbridged gap between what the legislature is said to have 
intended and what the words that the legislature chose to use actually do . . . .”  Id. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Stevens, supra note 100, at 899.  If there were to be a federal split-recovery statute, it should 
follow the model statute proposed in Stevens’s article.  Id. at 899–906.  His model statute includes 
(a) an identity provision, designating a special compensation fund as the beneficiary—thus 
eliminating Double Jeopardy Clause and Excessive Fines Clause concerns while creating a more 
equitable remedy—as well as determining the types of cases the statute will apply to; (b) an 
allocation provision that identifies the percentage of the punitive damage award to be allocated after 
attorney’s fees are awarded; and (c) the aforementioned timing provision.  Id. 
 207.  Id. at 904–06. 
 208.  See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 209.  See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text. 
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It is no secret that the federal government has broad discretion to tax.210  
Additionally, under the Spending Power, Congress can spend money—
including any collected under the taxing power—as it sees fit if such 
spending rationally relates to the general public welfare,211 allowing public 
expenditures to evade recuse under a Beckwith or Sperry analysis for an 
unreasonably related expenditure.212 
A few scholars have voiced concern over the ramifications of a federal 
monitory punitive damage tax.  These voices agree that such a tax would 
“reduce the plaintiff’s windfall,” but assert that “it would at the same time 
reduce the defendant’s punishment below that which a jury would have 
awarded.”213  Additionally, mavens contend that “such an excise tax . . . 
could be easily circumvented through settlement in most cases” where 
punitive damages are “disguise[d]” as compensatory damages.214  However, 
these arguments are open to inquest. 
 
 210.  See License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 471 (1866) (“It is true that the power of Congress to tax 
is a very extensive power.  It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two 
qualifications.  Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of 
apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity.  Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches 
every subject, and may be exercised at discretion.”).  According to some scholars, “It is also possible 
that a state could avoid the Eighth Amendment question altogether by drafting or interpreting its 
statute as a tax on the plaintiff’s punitive damage award, rather than as a direct payment from the 
defendant to the state.”  Recent Case, supra note 101, at 1696. 
  One academic contemplated what would happen if a state legislature used “a special tax on 
all punitive awards to eliminate the plaintiff’s windfall” rather than split-recovery statutes.  Klaben, 
supra note 96, at 116 n.76.  He determined that while states are given broad discretion to impose and 
collect taxes, id. (citing Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 344 (1989)), 
the Constitution prohibits a state from enacting a tax “so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it 
does not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and effect, the direct 
exertion of a different and forbidden power . . . .”  Id. (quoting Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 
40, 44 (1934)).  In light of the foregoing, the scholar concluded that the Supreme Court would find a 
special tax on punitive damages to be a mere regulation, and, therefore, an unconstitutional taking.  
Id.  The federal government, on the other hand, is not bound by such narrowing restrictions.  Id. 
 211.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, § 8; South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (reviewing 
Congress’s ability to use tax revenue under the spending power). 
 212.  See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text. 
 213.  Gregg D. Polsky & Dan Markel, Taxing Punitive Damages, 96 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1351 
(2010).  Because these are cases where a state split-recovery statute would be ineffective, there 
should not be any concern about the federal government cutting into money that should be going to 
benefit the state. 
 214.  Id. at 1350.  Perhaps the greatest foreseeable potential flaw with a federal monitory tax on 
punitive damages is that it would be viewed as a regulation rather than a tax.  See Ruth Mason, 
Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CAL. L. REV. 975 (2011) (analyzing Congress’s ability to tax).  
This would be fatal.  Id. at 977.  Although Congress has ample power to tax, if the tax is a hidden 
regulation, it is unconstitutional: 
Taxes are occasionally imposed in the discretion of the Legislature on proper subjects 
with the primary motive of obtaining revenue from them and with the incidental motive 
of discouraging them by making their continuance onerous. They do not lose their 
character as taxes because of the incidental motive. But there comes a time in the 
extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such 
and becomes a mere penalty, with the characteristics of regulation and punishment. 
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Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922); see also United 
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 69 (1936) (“The power of taxation, which is expressly granted, may, of 
course, be adopted as a means to carry into operation another power also expressly granted.  But 
resort to the taxing power to effectuate an end which is not legitimate, not within the scope of the 
Constitution, is obviously inadmissible.”).  Therefore, there is a fine line between a tax being a 
revenue-raising measure with incidental regulatory features and a tax being a hidden regulation. 
  As a general rule, to determine whether a statute is a tax or merely a regulatory scheme 
requires the inquisitor to view the objectives and purposes of the statute as whole.  47A C.J.S. 
Internal Revenue § 3 n.14 (citing Moon v. Freeman, 379 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1967)).  If, after review, 
it is concluded that revenue is the primary purpose for the statute, any regulation flowing therefrom 
is merely incidental and the statute is controlled by the taxing provisions of the Constitution.  Id.  
But if regulation is the primary goal of the statute, the “mere fact that incidental revenue is also 
obtained” makes the statute an unconstitutional sanction.  Id.  In the Child Labor Tax Case, the court 
found that the tax was designed to regulate child labor and not to collect revenue.  259 U.S. at 40–
41.  As such, it invaded the rights of the states and was invalid.  Id. at 36.  In United States v. Butler, 
297 U.S. 1, 61 (1936), the Court also used the aforementioned formula and concluded that the tax 
was a regulation because the tax was an “expropriation of money from one group for the benefit of 
another,” rather than “an exaction for the support of the Government.”  See also Am. Petrofina Co. 
of Tex. v. Nance, 859 F.2d 840, 841 (10th Cir. 1988) (“The mere fact a statute raises revenue does 
not imprint upon it the characteristics of a law by which the taxing power is exercised.”).  Since the 
mid-nineteenth century, however, the Supreme Court has upheld a number of seemingly regulatory 
taxes, obscuring the general rule for a tax’s constitutionality.  Mason, supra, at 1000–03. 
  Today, the rule seems to be: if it objectively reads like a tax, it is a tax even if it seems 
strictly regulatory.  47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 3.  There is no real consideration of motive: 
Inquiry into the hidden motives which may move Congress to exercise a power 
constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of courts.  They will not 
undertake, by collateral inquiry as to the measure of the regulatory effect of a tax, to 
ascribe to Congress an attempt, under the guise of taxation, to exercise another power 
denied by the Federal Constitution. 
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513–14 (1937) (citations omitted); see also Steward 
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–90 (1937) (“[T]o hold that motive or temptation is 
equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties.  The outcome of such a doctrine is 
the acceptance of a philosophical determinism by which choice becomes impossible.  Till now the 
law has been guided by a robust common sense which assumes the freedom of the will as a working 
hypothesis in the solution of its problems.”).  Therefore, it is unlikely that a court would hold a 
federal monitory tax to be unconstitutional even though one of its primary purposes would be to 
regulate punitive damages: 
Every tax is in some measure regulatory.  To some extent it interposes an economic 
impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed.  But a tax is not any 
the less a tax because it has a regulatory effect, and it has long been established that an 
Act of Congress which on its face purports to be an exercise of the taxing power is not 
any the less so because the tax is burdensome or tends to restrict or suppress the thing 
taxed. 
Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513 (citations omitted).  Additionally, due to the large monetary amount 
involved in punitive damage litigation, a federal monitory tax would raise sufficient funds—unlike 
the tax in the Child Labor Tax Case—to potentially escape any suspicion of being a hidden 
regulatory tax.  See HAMMESFAHR & NUGENT, supra note 42 §§ 1:8–1:10 (listing the monetary 
amounts of punitive damages over the past four decades).  For example, from 1979 to 1989 over 
$1.3 billion in punitive damages were awarded in California alone.  Id. § 1:10.  As such, a tax on that 
amount would have raised substantial revenue. 
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As to the first argument, if the federal government were to use a 
monitory tax to regulate punitive damage awards, the defendant would still 
have to pay any punitive amount decided by the jury.  Accordingly, 
punishment and deterrence would still be dutifully distributed.  Moreover, 
with only a percentage of the punitive damage awarded being taxed at a 
fixed rate, the plaintiff would retain an incentive to bring the suit and would 
also receive money to cover litigation expenses.215  With regard to the 
second argument, the Supreme Court has concluded that any money received 
in a settlement above that which is compensatory in nature connotes 
exemplary damages and is also taxable gross income.216  And although 
 
  Moreover, a federal monitory tax would be unlike the penalties which were held invalid in 
the Child Labor Tax Case, United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935) (excise tax used to 
regulate the sale of liquor), Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925) (tax used to regulate the 
practice of medicine), Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922) (tax used to regulate grain), and multiple 
other cases where the taxes were held to be instruments of regulation by virtue of their coercive 
effect on matters left to the control of the states.  Because, as discussed in Part V.A, a federal 
monitory tax on punitive damage would seek to eliminate the lack of regulation for punitive 
damages awarded on federal law claims, it is an area of the law that falls under the purview of the 
federal government.  Thus, a federal monitory tax would not encroach upon a state’s ability to 
regulate punitive damages and should not be held invalid. 
 215.  If a federal monitory punitive damage tax were enacted, it could learn from split-recovery 
statutes and employ the beneficiary parts of the statutes (like allowing attorney’s fees to be removed 
from the punitive damage award prior to the calculation and enforcement of the tax).  Mervine, 
supra note 21, at 1607 (an attorney should be able to take a contingency fee from the entire punitive 
damage amount as an incentive to file and follow through with the litigation).  Contra Gordon v. 
State, 608 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992) (in Florida, attorneys’ fees were to “be calculated based only 
on the portion of the judgment payable to the” plaintiff).  For the current punitive damage tax 
situation, there is a split on the issue—with some states permitting the attorney’s fees to be taken 
prior to calculating the tax while other jurisdictions require taxpayers to include the amount with 
their gross income.  SCHLUETER, supra note 63 § 18.1(C).  As a general rule, however, the Supreme 
Court has suggested that the “litigant’s income includes the portion of the recovery paid to the 
attorney as a contingent fee.”  Banks v. Comm’r, 543 U.S. 426, 430 (2005). 
  Additionally, a mandate could be included that juries would not be instructed of the tax.  See 
supra note 105 and accompanying text.  A valid argument made by many opponents of split-
recovery statutes is that if the citizens who compose a jury know that a substantial portion of a 
punitive damage award would be taken from the plaintiff and given to a state or specified fund vis-à-
vis a split-recovery statute, the jury would be more inclined to not only grant a punitive damage 
award, but a much larger punitive damage award: 
In Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 797 P.2d 1019 (1990), the court held that it was 
reversible error for the jury to be informed of the distribution of a punitive damages 
award, first to the claimant’s attorney, and then in equal parts to the state and the 
claimant. . . .  noting that punitive damages were designed to punish the offender and 
deter others from similar conduct, while the instructions to the jury here improperly 
shifted the jury’s consideration to how much of the award the plaintiff would be forced to 
share. 
Larsen, supra note 189; see Goldstein, supra note 21, at 108.  Furthermore, by using an already 
extant system and functional tool—the Internal Revenue Service—few judicial resources would need 
to be expended in creating and enforcing a federal monitory  tax. 
 216.  Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).  For such an inference it is 
important to look at the facts underlying Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.  In that case, 
Glenshaw Glass Company filed a fraud and anti-trust lawsuit against the manufacturer of its 
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parties may attempt to disguise punitive damages in a post-verdict 
settlement, a court reviewing the settlement should be able to compare the 
offer with the complaint to determine if the plaintiff received any post-
compensatory money.217  In this way, a federal monitory tax highlights the 
benefits of a split-recovery statute—preventing plaintiffs from receiving a 
windfall while remaining focused on the twin aims of punishment and 
deterrence regardless of the compensatory damage amount—without the 
uncertainty.218 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In the wake of the BP oil spill, it is most likely that the pearls soon to be 
found in the oysters of the Gulf Coast will not be white or even black, but 
green and in the shape of punitive damages.  Yet, an unshuckable question 
remains: how will punitive damages—a staple of American jurisprudence—
punish and deter BP and the other oil industry companies for engaging in 
malicious practices without leading to a windfall for plaintiffs?  Thus far, 
attempts to limit plaintiffs’ windfalls by refocusing punitive damage awards 
on society while remaining true to the twin aims of punishment and 
deterrence have been moderately successful.219  Split-recovery statutes—
supported by constitutional backing from the Ninth Circuit—have provided 
a glimmer of hope, but are easily overcome by the post-verdict settlement of 
 
equipment.  Id. at 427–28.  The two parties eventually settled the claim for $800,000, with 
“$324,529.94 represent[ing] payment of punitive damages for fraud and antitrust violations.”  Id. at 
428.  Therefore, the Court’s conclusion that the punitive damages were taxable as gross income 
means that the damage award amount above compensatory damages is considered income from the 
lawsuit and is taxable.  Id. at 432–33; see I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006) (defining gross income as “all 
income from whatever source derived”).  Moreover, after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Patton, 
such an argument seems circular in that a split-recovery statute would have to be modified in a 
manner to require the government’s consent to a settlement. 
 217.  In the vast majority of settlements, the parties will not allocate an amount for punitive 
damages.  SCHLUETER, supra note 63 § 18.3.  Under such circumstances, “[t]he court must look 
beyond the settlement language and determine the basis for the damages,” id. § 18.3 n.5 (citing 
Bagley v. Comm’r, 105 T.C. 396, 406 (1995)), and take the following steps: “(1) look to the express 
language of the agreement; (2) determine the amount was ‘in lieu of what’ damages; and (3) should 
neither engage in speculation nor blind themselves to a settlement’s realities.”  Id.  Additionally, an 
express allocation of the settlement is not necessarily dispositive of the intent of the parties.  Id. 
 218.  Economic Analysis, supra note 74, at 1917–19 (encouraging the use of a tax on punitive 
damages to help eliminate plaintiffs’ windfalls).  But see Lawrence Zelenak, Of Punitive Damages, 
Tax Deductions, and Tax-Aware Juries: A Response to Polsky and Markel, 96 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 
61, 64 (2010) (claiming that the IRS would not be able to “identify with perfect accuracy in every 
instance how much of a settlement was paid with respect to punitive damage claims”). 
 219.  See supra notes 73–103 and accompanying text. 
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the parties.220  Considering the lack of regulation by the federal courts of 
punitive damages, “[t]he time is thus ripe for reconceptualizing the civil 
damages landscape,”221 and federal action through a federal monitory tax 
appears to be the most appropriate response.222 
 
Skyler M. Sanders* 
 
  
 
 220.  See supra notes 92–102, 195–208 and accompanying text. 
 221.  Sharkey, supra note 74, at 352. 
 222.  See supra notes 209–18 and accompanying text. 
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VIII.  APPENDICIES 
Appendix A.  Current Split-Recovery Statutes by State 
Statute Text 
ALASKA STAT. § 
09.17.020(j) (2011) 
If a person receives an award of punitive 
damages, the court shall require that 50 percent 
of the award be deposited into the general fund 
of the state.  This subsection does not grant the 
state the right to file or join a civil action to 
recover punitive damages. 
 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 
24-75-201.7 (2011) 
Any punitive or exemplary damages awarded 
to any party to a lawsuit brought to enforce the 
restriction on state spending as set forth in 
section 24-75-201.1 shall be deposited and 
credited to the property tax relief fund, which 
is hereby created in the state treasury.  All 
moneys in the fund at the end of any fiscal year 
shall remain in the fund and shall not be 
transferred or credited to the state general fund 
or to any other state fund.  All interest derived 
from the deposit and investment of moneys in 
the fund shall be credited to the fund. Moneys 
in said fund shall be used only in such manner 
as the general assembly deems appropriate as 
to provide property tax relief throughout the 
state and shall never be available for 
appropriation for any other state purpose. 
 
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-
12-5.1(e)(1–2) (2011) 
(1) In a tort case in which the cause of action 
arises from product liability, there shall be no 
limitation regarding the amount which may be 
awarded as punitive damages. Only one award of 
punitive damages may be recovered in a court in 
this state from a defendant for any act or 
omission if the cause of action arises from 
product liability, regardless of the number of 
causes of action which may arise from such act 
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or omission. 
(2) Seventy-five percent of any amounts awarded 
under this subsection as punitive damages, less a 
proportionate part of the costs of litigation, 
including reasonable attorney’s fees, all as 
determined by the trial judge, shall be paid into 
the treasury of the state through the Office of the 
State Treasurer.  Upon issuance of judgment in 
such a case, the state shall have all rights due a 
judgment creditor until such judgment is satisfied 
and shall stand on equal footing with the plaintiff 
of the original case in securing a recovery after 
payment to the plaintiff of damages awarded 
other than as punitive damages.  A judgment 
debtor may remit the state’s proportional share of 
punitive damages to the clerk of the court in 
which the judgment was rendered. It shall be the 
duty of the clerk to pay over such amounts to the 
Office of the State Treasurer within 60 days of 
receipt from the judgment debtor.  This 
paragraph shall not be construed as making the 
state a party at interest and the sole right of the 
state is to the proceeds as provided in this 
paragraph. 
 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/2-1207 (West 
2011) 
The trial court may also in its discretion, 
apportion the punitive damage award among 
the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s attorney and the 
State of Illinois Department of Human 
Services.  
 
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-
51-3-6 (West 2011) 
(a) . . . when a finder of fact announces a 
verdict that includes a punitive damage award 
in a civil action, the party against whom the 
judgment was entered shall notify the office of 
the attorney general of the punitive damage 
award.   
(b) When a punitive damage award is paid, the 
party against whom the judgment was entered 
shall pay the punitive damage award to the 
clerk of the court where the action is pending.  
(c) Upon receiving the payment described in 
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subsection (b), the clerk of the court shall:  
(1) pay the person to whom punitive damages 
were awarded twenty-five percent (25%) of the 
punitive damage award; and  
(2) pay the remaining seventy-five percent 
(75%) of the punitive damage award to the 
treasurer of state, who shall deposit the funds 
into the violent crime victims compensation 
fund established by IC 5-2-6.1-40.   
(d) The office of the attorney general may 
negotiate and compromise a punitive damage 
award described in subsection (c)(2).   
(e) The state’s interest in a punitive damage 
award described in subsection (c)(2) is 
effective when a finder of fact announces a 
verdict that includes punitive damages. 
 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 
668A.1 (West 2011) 
 
1. In a trial of a claim involving the request for 
punitive or exemplary damages, the court shall 
instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories 
or, if there is no jury, shall make findings, 
indicating all of the following: 
a. Whether, by a preponderance of clear, 
convincing, and satisfactory evidence, the 
conduct of the defendant from which the claim 
arose constituted willful and wanton disregard 
for the rights or safety of another. 
b. Whether the conduct of the defendant was 
directed specifically at the claimant, or at the 
person from which the claimant’s claim is 
derived. 
2. An award for punitive or exemplary damages 
shall not be made unless the answer or finding 
pursuant to subsection 1, paragraph “a”, is 
affirmative.  If such answer or finding is 
affirmative, the jury, or court if there is no jury, 
shall fix the amount of punitive or exemplary 
damages to be awarded, and such damages shall 
be ordered paid as follows: 
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a. If the answer or finding pursuant to subsection 
1, paragraph “b”, is affirmative, the full amount 
of the punitive or exemplary damages awarded 
shall be paid to the claimant. 
b. If the answer or finding pursuant to subsection 
1, paragraph “b”, is negative, after payment of all 
applicable costs and fees, an amount not to 
exceed twenty-five percent of the punitive or 
exemplary damages awarded may be ordered 
paid to the claimant, with the remainder of the 
award to be ordered paid into a civil reparations 
trust fund administered by the state court 
administrator.  Funds placed in the civil 
reparations trust shall be under the control and 
supervision of the executive council, and shall be 
disbursed only for purposes of indigent civil 
litigation programs or insurance assistance 
programs. 
 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 
537.675 (West 2011) 
The State of Missouri shall have a lien for 
deposit into the tort victims’ compensation 
fund to the extent of fifty percent of the 
punitive damage final judgment which shall 
attach in any such case after deducting 
attorney’s fees and expenses. . . . The state 
cannot enforce its lien until there is a punitive 
damage final judgment.  Cases resolved by 
arbitration, mediation or compromise 
settlement prior to a punitive damage final 
judgment are exempt from the provisions of 
this section.  
 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78B-8-201(3) (West 
2011). 
 
(a) In any case where punitive damages are 
awarded, the court shall enter judgment as 
follows: 
(i) for the first $50,000, judgment shall be in 
favor of the injured party; and 
(ii) any amount in excess of $50,000 shall be 
divided equally between the state and the injured 
party, and judgment to each entered accordingly. 
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Appendix B.  Federal Statutes That Permit Punitive Damages 
Statute 
6 U.S.C. § 1142(d)(3) 
(2006)  
Text 
Firing or otherwise discriminating against a 
public transportation employee for reporting a 
violation of federal law or for refusing to 
violate a federal law 
 
7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(10)(ii) 
(2006)  
Failure to correctly register as a futures 
association 
 
7 U.S.C. §§ 601–24, 
1301–1992 (2006) 
Violations of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Acts 
 
10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(2) 
(2006)  
Violating the terms required to extend 
consumer credit to members of the armed 
forces and their dependents 
 
10 U.S.C. § 2207(a)(2) 
(2006) 
Giving gratuity in order to secure a 
Department of Defense contract 
 
12 U.S.C. § 1723a(e) 
(2006)  
Using the words “Federal National Mortgage 
Association,” “Government National 
Mortgage Association,” or any combination 
thereof as the name or part of the name for a 
sole proprietorship, association, partnership, or 
corporation 
 
12 U.S.C. §§ 1972, 
1975 (2006)  
Bank requiring a customer to obtain additional 
services from the bank before extending credit 
in violation of the Bank Holding Company 
Act 
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12 U.S.C. § 3417(a)(3) 
(2006)  
Unlawful intentional disclosure of a customers 
financial information 
 
15 U.S.C. § 298(c) 
(2006)  
Frivolous suits by jewelry trade associations 
for injunctive relief 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) 
(2006)  
Ability to recover any profits gained by the 
defendant in addition to plaintiff’s damages or 
court costs for trademark infringement in 
violation of the Lanham Act 
 
15 U.S.C. § 
1681n(a)(2) (2006)  
 
Consumer protection from credit reporting 
agencies 
15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) 
(2006)  
Creditors discriminating against an individual 
based on race, religion, national origin, sex, 
marital status, or age 
 
  
15 U.S.C. § 
2622(b)(2)(B) (2006)  
Termination or discrimination against an 
employee by an employer for reporting or not 
participating in the unlawful control of toxic 
substances 
 
15 U.S.C. § 
2805(d)(1)(B) (2006) 
Franchisor of motor fuels unlawfully violates 
relationship with franchisee 
 
18 U.S.C. § 
2252A(f)(2)(B) (2006)  
 
Civil damages related to child pornography 
18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)(2) 
(2006)  
Unlawful use of any person’s wire, oral, or 
electronic communication 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) 
(2006)  
Violations of the “Stored Wire and Electronic 
Communications and Transactional Records 
Access” statute 
 
18 U.S.C. § 
2710(c)(2)(B) (2006)  
Wrongful disclosure of video tape rental or 
sale records 
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18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(2) 
(2006)  
“Prohibition on Release and Use of Certain 
Personal Information from State Motor 
Vehicle Records” 
 
22 U.S.C. § 2399b(b) 
(2006)  
False or misleading information about 
commodities 
 
25 U.S.C. § 305e(c) 
(2006)  
 
Misrepresentation of Indian produced goods 
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) 
(Supp. 2009)  
A foreign state that is or was a state sponsor of 
terrorism, which lead to personal injury or 
death 
 
31 U.S.C. § 
3720D(e)(2) (2006) 
Employer fires or otherwise discriminates 
again an employee because the United States 
Government is garnishing the employee’s 
income to pay back taxes 
 
31 U.S.C. § 3729 
(2006)  
 
Filing false claims against the government 
33 U.S.C. § 1514(c) 
(2006)  
Person willfully violates a rule of the 
Deepwater Ports statute 
 
39 U.S.C. § 3018(g)(2) 
(2006) 
 
Mailing hazardous material 
  
41 U.S.C. § 
4705(b)(d)(2) (Supp. 
IV 2011)  
Termination or discrimination against a 
federal contractor employee “as a reprisal for 
disclosing to a Member of Congress or an 
authorized official of an executive agency or 
the Department of Justice information relating 
to a substantial violation of law related to a 
contract”  
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42 U.S.C. § 300aa-
23(d) (2006)  
 
Vaccine manufacturer found to be liable 
42 U.S.C. § 300j-
9(i)(2)(B)(ii) (2006)  
Termination or discrimination against an 
employee by an employer for reporting or not 
participating in the unlawful violation of 
drinking water regulations 
 
42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 
3613(c)(1) (2006)  
Discrimination in the sale or rental of housing 
based on race, religion, color, gender, martial 
status, or national origin 
 
42 U.S.C. § 7622(d) 
(2006)  
Employee is dismissed, demoted, or 
discriminated against for testifying or planning 
on testifying against company for air pollution 
 
42 U.S.C. § 13981 
(2006)  
 
Violation of the Violence Against Women Act 
45 U.S.C. § 711(j) 
(2006)  
Using the words “United States Railway 
Association” as a name for any business 
purpose 
 
47 U.S.C. § 
338(i)(7)(B) (2006)  
Unlawful disclosure of personal information 
by a satellite provider 
 
47 U.S.C. § 
551(f)(2)(B) (2006) 
Unlawful disclosure of personal information 
by a cable operator 
 
49 U.S.C. § 5122(a) 
(2006)  
Unlawful transportation of hazardous 
materials 
 
49 U.S.C. § 
28103(a)(1)–(2) (2006)  
Civil cases arising under rail passenger 
transportation 
 
50 U.S.C. § 1828(2) 
(2006) 
Where a person’s “premises, property, 
information, or material has been subjected to 
a physical search within the United States or 
about whom information obtained by such a 
physical search has been disclosed or used in 
violation of “ the War and National Defense 
statute 
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50 U.S.C. § 2702(k) 
(2006)  
Where an “individual has been discharged, 
demoted, or otherwise discriminated against as 
a reprisal for making a protected disclosure” 
about the Atomic Energy Defense Program 
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